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This essay analyzes Max Weber’s place in post-World War II US social thought, when English-
language translations, interpretations, and applications of his work proliferated and it became 
widely known in American sociology and related fields. The focus is on shifting interpretations 
and meanings of Weber’s work in different phases of postwar American culture, society, and 
politics from the Cold War era through the post-9/11 years. Weber’s ideas have been fused with 
those of diverse thinkers and traditions and have been applied in ways that he likely would have 
rejected and that stricter Weberians castigate. The various Weber fusions engage modernization 
theory - arguably the postwar era’s primary metanarrative for legitimating and challenging the 
liberal democratic policy regime. The historical discussion provides context for later sections on 
Weber’s salience in the US today and for a possible Weber fusion after postwar modernization.  
 
 
Max Weber has been understood and constructed in divergent ways in different 
historical moments and contexts. His rich, multisided corpus is open to diverse 
interpretations, and, thus, arguments about its overall shape or main thrust have 
varied widely. And just when he seems to have lost relevance, like a phoenix he 
appears again on the horizon. This essay analyzes his place in post-World War II 
US social thought, when English-language translations, interpretations, and 
applications of his work proliferated and it became widely known in American 
sociology and related fields. (2) His ideas have been fused with those of other 
thinkers and applied in ways that he likely would have rejected and that stricter 
Weberians castigate. Even Weber’s hostile critics often have employed facets of his 
thought (often unknowingly) against him. Like Nietzsche’s views, Weber’s ideas 
have been “in the air,” and much of his impact has been tacit. His concepts and 
vocabulary have been embedded in wider rationalization and modernization 




work in different phases of postwar American culture, society, and politics. The 
divergent readings have been entwined with broader debates over modernization, 
arguably a master discourse of postwar US politics. The historical discussion is 
context for later sections on Weber’s salience in the US today. Although referring 
often to Weber specialists, the main focus is on a wider array of thinkers who 
deployed his ideas to engage wider cultural, political, and theoretical issues. ( )    
 
 
1. Weber in the Early Post-World War II Conjuncture: Modernization For and Against 
 
1.1. Parsons’ Weber: Modernization as American-led, Evolutionary Progress 
  
Weber’s work became widely known in the US, during the post-World War II era, 
when American higher education expanded massively and sociology was 
institutionalized as part of the core college and university curriculum. Leading 
sociological theorist, Talcott Parsons initiated the reception of Weber among North 
American sociologists in the 1930s. His translation of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism, published in 1930, has been read by several 
generations of sociologists. (4) In an influential interpretive work, Parsons portrayed 
Weber as a pivotal figure in a fundamental progressive turn in modern social 
thought toward the (Parsonsian) “voluntaristic theory of action” (Parsons [1937] 
1968). After the war, Parsons exerted enormous influence on US sociology, 
stimulating increased interest in Weber. (5) Parsons (1971, pp. 144) held that 
Weber’s work, especially his studies of world religions and ascetic Protestantism, 
constitute the “most important single reference for interpretation of modern 
society...” He reinterpreted and integrated into his own theory facets of Weber’s 
views about the formative impact of religious ideas on modern cultural 
rationalization. Criticizing Marxian and libertarian economism, Parsons implied that 
Weber converged with the Durkheimian emphasis on the overarching importance of 
shared social values and social integration.  Although acknowledging Marx’s 
influence on Weber, Parsons pitted the two theorists against each other. (6)  
Parsons did not emphasize Weber’s ideas about value conflict, coercion, and 
hierarchy. Stressing societal consensus, he translated Weber’s concept of Herrschaft 
as “leadership,” “authority,” or  “imperative control,” rather than as “domination.” 
(7) Parsons conceived of power as a collective resource to achieve social system 
imperatives, providing a functionalist twist that was absent in Weber. Parsons 
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argued that postwar US professionalization reduced sharply line-authority, forged 
post-bureaucratic “collegial” authority, and democratized corporations. (8)  He held 
that his structural-functionalist views of professional authority and complex 
organization and of the overall social system and evolutionary progress merely 
updated Weber’s thought. (9) A central facet of American sociological theory for 
over twenty years, Parsons’ Weber legitimated the early postwar era’s “liberal 
consensus,” or the view that US capitalism’s secularized Protestantism, managerial 
firms, advanced technology, and modest Keynesian regulatory and welfare-state 
policies unlocked the secret of continuous growth, ended class warfare, and 
increased substantially the opportunities and participation of disadvantaged 
minorities. (10) Parsons’ Weber was woven into the fabric of Cold-War era 
modernization theory, attributing universal significance to American values and 
institutions. Parsonsian theory portrayed the US as a substantively rational society 
that reached heretofore unimaginable heights of social integration, equal 
opportunity, and democracy. Equating unabashedly postwar modernization with 
“Americanization,” Parsons held that the process was an “irreversible” evolutionary 
trend in the west and that the US was modernity’s “new lead society.” He argued 
that an Americanized “New Europe” already was emergent and that all nations that 
wanted to be modern, even the state socialist bloc, would converge eventually with 
the US model (i.e., a just meritocracy that balances the market and state and 
efficiency and social justice) (Parsons 1971, pp. 86, 128-9).  
 
 
1.2. Critical Weber: Modernization as Domination 
 
The introduction, translation, and selection of essays in Hans H. Gerth’s and C. 
Wright Mills’ Weber (1946a) collection, which is still widely used today, countered 
Parsons’ Weber. Comparing their translation of a section of Weber’s work to that of 
Parsons, Mills declared: “The son of bitch [Parsons] translated it so as to take all 
the guts, the radical guts, out of it, whereas our translation doesn’t do that!” (11)  
Rather than opposing Weber to Marx, Gerth and Mills saw the two theorists to 
converge at key points and to offer supplements to each other’s theories at other 
important junctures. In Gerth’s and Mills’ (1946,  p. 73) view, Weber 
“incorporated” into his own theory so much of Marx’s critique of capitalism that he 
too saw “the economic system as a compulsive apparatus rather than as the locus of 
freedom.” This coercive view of capitalism was the crux of their disagreement with 
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Parsons. Gerth’s and Mills’ Critical Weber helped stir wider opposition to Parsons’ 
structural-functionalism and consensus theories of postwar-US capitalism. 
Translating Weber’s bureaucracy essay, Gerth and Mills used the term 
“domination” at important junctures. In the translations and introductory essay, 
they drew out Weber’s emphases on hierarchical subordination, impersonal 
discipline, monopolies of resources and information, and mass democracy, which 
limits participation and levels the masses below the top. (12) They also translated 
Weber’s essays on politics and science as vocations, which stressed Enlightenment 
rationality’s limits, criticized claims about progress, and warned about political 
demagoguery and the total state. Holding that Weber acknowledged American 
capitalism’s material and human waste and racial problems, they wove his ideas into 
a formally rational vision of the postwar US, efficient in domination, but limited in 
democracy. Conversely to Parsons’ autonomous view of culture and linkage of 
Weberian theory to German Idealism, they held that Weber saw ideas to be 
entwined with material and ideal interests and to be mediated by groups that seek to 
realize them. Gerth and Mills also published Weber’s arguments about religion’s 
tensions with politics, art, sexuality, and science and about how modern cultural 
rationalization multiplies conflictive value spheres. Rather than stressing 
convergence with Durkheim, they noted Weber’s engagement with Nietzsche as well 
as with Marx and his affinities with John Dewey’s and George Herbert Mead’s 
pragmatism. They rejected Parsons’ functionalist, evolutionist reading of Weber, 
which implied that value consensus and normative integration were “in between the 
lines” of Weber’s work. Contra Parsons’ effusive cultural optimism, Gerth and Mills 
stressed Weber’s fears about the possible fate of modernity (e.g., “Egyptification” 
or the total state) and impassioned warnings about the possible eclipse of the 
autonomous individual that he valued so dearly. (13) 
Parsons’ Weber amplified sensibilities accompanying the early postwar era’s long 
economic boom, major technological advances, and increased inclusion. Parsons’ 
believed that US dominance served progressive global trends. By contrast, Gerth 
and Mills stressed American society’s technocratic features, political and cultural 
regimentation, and forms of exclusion. They had highly ambivalent views about the 
US’ leading role in the world. (14) The divergent approaches are transparent in 
Parsons’ and Mills’ respective stances about postmodernity. Concluding The System 
of Modern Societies, Parsons dismissed  “ideological pessimism,” asserting that the 
distinctly American, “culminating” phase of modernization would continue for 
another century or more and that claims about a dawning “‘postmodern’ society” 
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were “decidedly premature” (1971, pp. 142-3). By contrast, Mills warned about 
“the ending of the modern age” and a “postmodern” terminus of the Enlightenment 
dream of fusing rationality and freedom. He decried mass society’s “cheerful 
robots,” enthralled by “accumulation of gadgets,” compliant to elite demands, blind 
to injustices, and politically irresponsible (Mills 1961, pp. 165-76). 
Speaking of  “pretentious triviality,” Mills charged that US social science 
marginalized public intellectuals and disparaged “big discourses,”or social theories 
of classical breadth, which can offer tools for democratic publics to identify 
themselves and reclaim the values of freedom and rationality (1961, 182-4). He 
charged that Parsons’ “Grand Theory” epitomizes sociological theorists’ tendency to 
withdraw from addressing history, power, and public issues. Mills engaged diverse 
theorists, but his theoretical ideas and critiques of American culture included a 
strong Weberian thread. Mills was very critical of Marxism and communism, but his 
support for radical democratic politics and politically-organized workers was 
animated, at least, partially, by his engagement with Marx. Mills held that the 
enduring, culturally significant work of Weber and other classical theorists was, in 
part, due to their “dialogue with Karl Marx,” a thinker that the vast majority of 
postwar American sociologists either ignored or dismissed (Mills 1961, p. 48).  
Mills had a strong affinity for the spirit of Marx, if not the letter of his work. While 
almost all Marxist and leftist theorists still saw Weber strictly as a bourgeois anti-
Marxist, Gerth and Mills began a Marx-Weber fusion that was carried further by the 
coming generation. (15)  
 
 
1.3. Anti-Liberal Weber: Modernization as Descent 
 
Anti-liberal “Weberians” are sharply critical of  Weber. They turn his Nietzschean 
side against his liberalism. (16) In a more singular way than Gerth and Mills, they 
stress his views about the leveling and disciplining force of instrumental 
rationalization. Weber sometimes implied that the process operated like a 
locomotive flattening everything in its path and creating an all-encompassing “steel-
hard casing,” “cage of bondage,” or “iron cage.” For example, following glowing 
comments about his experience of local culture in Oklahoma Territory, he declared: 
“Too bad; in a year this place will look like Oklahoma [City], that is, like any other 
American city. With almost lightening speed everything that stands in the way of 
capitalistic culture is being crushed.” (17) Weber elaborated this process in his 
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arguments about bureaucratic structure, calculation, and routine and about 
intellectualization and disenchantment. He saw instrumental rationalization and 
related cultural differentiation to multiply cultural spheres, rationalize them in 
accord with their own internal logics, sharpen value conflicts, and render culture 
incoherent and individuals deracinated and homeless. Weber affirmed the value of 
science, but held that it cannot answer questions of value or create meaning. (18) In 
his view, this fragmentation is made more problematic by rampant demagoguery, 
plebiscitarian dictators, corrupt media, poorly-informed, manipulable publics, and 
short-sighted bureaucrats. I call this dark side of Weber’s account of rationalization, 
in isolation from other parts of his work that affirm modernity, the “homogenization-
regimentation thesis.” Theorists have expressed it in diverse forms, as a single 
thread in broader arguments or, especially, as a main theme in critiques of “mass 
society.” (19) 
Anti-liberal Weberians imply that cultural erosion and loss of collective agency, 
arising from instrumental rationalization, are so great that they make a mockery of 
liberal democracy. (20) They ignore, diminish, or reject Weber’s arguments about 
individual autonomy and freedom of conscience, bureaucratic accountability and 
limited authority, scientific culture and political responsibility, cultural freedom and 
value pluralism, countervailing power, and other affirmative facets of his account of 
liberal-democratic culture. Anti-liberal versions of the homogenization-regimentation 
thesis decouple liberalism from democracy and, thus, split sharply from Parsons’ 
Weber and from Critical Weber, which occupy divergent points on a liberal-
democratic continuum. Although converging with Critical Weber’s pessimistic 
themes, anti-liberals would never accept Gerth’s and Mills’ liberal-democratic 
reformism or fusion of Weber with Marx, American pragmatism, and Mannheimian 
sociology of knowledge. Anti-liberals see US-led, liberal-democratic modernization 
and individualist, consumer freedom to be a descent. They imply that liberal 
democracy’s fragmentation and moral corrosion create the cultural conditions for 
totalitarianism. In their view, this liberal regime cries out for fundamental socio-
political and cultural transformation. However, anti-liberals usually leave vague the 
legal, institutional, and political changes called for by their divergent politics (e.g., 
populism, aristocracy, theocracy). Thus, the meaning of their anti-liberalism for 
actually-existing democracy is an open question. 
During World War II and in the early postwar period, a diverse group of mostly 
émigré scholars decried “relativistic” American liberalism.(21) Their anti-liberalism 
has roots in Weimar-era thought. Having wide impact on later generations, Marxist 
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Georg Lukács and proto-Nazi Carl Schmitt attacked Weber, but they deployed 
facets of his vision of instrumental rationalization in their dismissive critiques of 
capitalism and liberalism.(22) Influenced by Weber and other Weimar theorists, 
postwar émigré scholars posed parallel homogenization-regimentation theses, which 
portrayed Western modernity to have lost its moral compass and to be in profound 
crisis. They contended that liberalism subverts the firmly held values needed to 
resist totalitarianism and to provide an alternative to consumer culture’s mediocrity 
and excess. Anti-liberals saw American sociology’s postwar ascendence and, 
especially, its positivism to manifest a leveled, degraded culture. Few of these 
thinkers knew much about the discipline, but they all had some knowledge of 
Weber’s social thought and its wide impact on Weimar era culture and politics. 
Many of them viewed him to be the greatest social scientist (Strauss [1950] 1965, 
pp. 36-37, Gunnell 2004, pp. 151-52). However, they argued that his ideas about 
value neutrality and value pluralism manifest the type of relativistic, nihilistic 
liberalism that they believed to be rampant in postwar, US sociology and culture. 
They saw American interest in Weber to be a destructive influence. As Allan Bloom 
later claimed, Weber’s “sociological terminology” spread “German Pathos” in the 
postwar US.(23) The émigré scholars attacked John Dewey’s pragmatism for its 
parallel affirmation of liberal pluralism and social science. Like Weber, Dewey 
rejected moral absolutes, but he had higher hopes about social science’s possible 
contribution to public life and democracy. Max Horkheimer  charged that Dewey’s 
“optimism... conceals a greater political defeatism than the pessimism of Weber.” 
(24) Émigré scholars thought that Weber’s tragic view of modernity’s profound 
ambiguities and unresolvable problems to be more penetrating and revealing about 
the depth of liberalism’s crisis.(25) Although attacking Weber, they viewed him and 
American culture through lenses colored by his ideas, especially those that reflected 
his pessimistic side and were influenced by his engagement with Nietzsche.   
Countering Weber’s liberalism, émigré political theorists, Leo Strauss ([1950] 1965 
pp. 35-80) and Eric Voegelin ([1952] 1966 pp. 13-26) advocated “natural right” 
theory or the establishment of a regime based on objectively true, absolute values. 
Both theorists attacked Weber’s arguments about the separation of facts and values 
in scientific practices and about the inevitable conflict of values in the wider culture. 
In their view, his nihilistic “historicism” or “Gnostic immanentism” favors a culture 
of  lost souls who cannot grasp the good and for whom nothing is forbidden.(26) 
They saw Weber’s views to cultivate individualism and egalitarianism, which they 
argued undermine moral authority and genuine culture. They held that his rejection 
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of a higher rationality that can identify true values from the vortex of 
incommensurable, conflictive opinions and his limitation of social knowledge of 
normative matters to hermeneutic clarification of conflictive values and sociological 
analysis of value-oriented action’s consequences abandon truth and good to 
individual whim. They wanted cultural leadership by philosophical or religious 
elites, capable of exercising reason, forging political rule based on true values, and 
insuring that people know the good and observe the duties it commands. They 
attacked Weber’s alleged nihilism, but their view of the US as an ethically flattened, 
instrumentalized, philistine culture bore the imprint of the Nietzschean-Weberian 
homogenization-regimentation thesis. Strauss and Voeglin held that Marxism and 
communism culminate monstrously liberal historicist or gnostic immanentist 
tendencies and threaten permanent neutralization of genuine culture. (27) Seeing 
the US to be the global bulwark against communism, however, they did not reject 
American culture entirely and made concessions to its liberal-democratic institutions 
with the hope of defeating communism and igniting reform based on a recovery of 
the West’s religious and classical philosophical roots. Both theorists were vague 
about their precise political intentions, but their emphatic arguments about the need 
for an absolute order of value imply a hierarchical political order converse to 
liberal-democratic conceptions of discursive democracy. 
Herbert Marcuse argued that Weber’s type of value relativism and positivism 
undercuts the will and imagination to forge a liberated society and, thus, 
consecrates the existent liberal order as substantively rational. Although rejecting 
Weber more emphatically than either Strauss or Voegelin, Marcuse deployed the 
Nietzschean-Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis more transparently and 
sweepingly. He portrayed relentless instrumental rationalization and 
bureaucratization constructing an “ever more solid shell of bondage.” (28) Other 
Frankfurt School theorists made parallel moves. Their original Hegelian-Marxian 
roots typified the historicism that Strauss and Voegelin deplored. Rejecting absolute 
truths, they claimed to derive their normative standpoints from analyzing 
emancipatory possibilities embedded in existing culture and social institutions.(29) 
However, Nazism, Fascism, Hiroshima, the Holocaust, Stalinism, and consumer 
capitalism dimmed their hopes about “finding the ideal in the real,” or  identifying, 
radicalizing, and realizing historical, emacipatory ideals. Their views about “one-
dimensional culture,” “dialectic of enlightenment,” “eclipse of reason,” “total 
administration,” and “culture industry” portrayed a culture devoid of opposition 
and resources to even envision transcendence of alienated social relations. Their 
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immanent critique or ideology critique came up empty; the emancipatory working 
class failed to appear and they could not detect an alternative collective subject on 
the horizon. They held that propaganda and mass culture blurred the line between 
ideology and reality, foreclosing possibilities for liberation, and shifted to an entirely 
negative critique or sought a nonhistorical basis for critical theory. (30) Describing 
liberal-democratic capitalism as an “open-air prison,” Adorno argued that there: 
“are no more ideologies in the authentic sense of false consciousness, only 
advertisements for the world through its duplication and the provocative lie which 
does not seek belief but commands silence.” He concluded that “phenomena 
rigidify, become insignias of the absolute rule of that which is” and that the 
“immanent method.... is dragged into the abyss by its object” (1981, p. 34). 
Similarly, Marcuse (1964, p. 257) ended his One-Dimensional Man with the 
declaration that critical theory offers no hope about a “good end”to postwar culture 
and that the theory “remains negative” - loyal to the hopeless ones, who dedicate 
their lives to the “Great Refusal.” Some Frankfurt School theorists did not give into 
this pessimism, and those who embraced the regimentation-homogenization thesis 
did not always do so consistently. However, pessimistic Frankfurt School theorists, 
although not attacking liberalism as fundamentally as Strauss and Voegelin, implied 
such a low estimation of its existent forms that they left vague needed institutional 
and political changes. (31) 
These types of early postwar era, anti-liberalism reappeared with later shifts in 
American politics and culture. The Frankfurt School, especially Marcuse, had 
impact on the New Left, while Natural Right thinkers, especially Strauss, helped 
shape the intellectual and political backlash to New Deal liberalism, the New Left, 
and 1960s youth culture. As stated above, Carl Schmitt exerted major influence on 
émigré scholars. (32) However, Heidegger may have had even wider impact on 
many of these thinkers. Karl Löwith provided a moving description of Weber’s 
“Science as Vocation” speech that portrayed him as the prototype anti-Nazi spirit. 
Löwith followed this portrayal with a chilling portrait of his former teacher 
Heidegger, during his Nazi phase, as the opposite type of character. (33)  
Heidegger’s view of cultural leveling, which had little to do with Weber, had a much 
greater affinity for Nazism than the Weber-infused version of the homogenization-
regimentation thesis. Heidegger exerted an independent influence on the anti-liberal 
émigré scholars. (34) However, many “Weberians,” who engaged seriously 
Heidegger’s work (including the émigré scholars), likely read Weber through a 
Heideggerian lens, or the converse, and, thus, fused themes from both theorists. A 
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later 20th century revival of interest in Schmitt and Heidegger helped sir renewed 
anti-liberalism on the left as well as on the right.  
 
 
2. The Postwar Era Winding Down: Vicissitudes of Modernization and 
Postmodernization  
 
2.1. New Sociology and Marx-Weber Fusions: Rethinking Modernization 
 
By 1970, the idea of progressive modernization was superceded by concern over 
fractious splits, crises, and decline. In the preface of a much debated book, Alvin 
Gouldner declared that: 
Social theorists today work within a crumbling social matrix of paralyzed urban 
centers and battered campuses. Some may put cotton in their ears, but their bodies 
still feel the shock waves. It is no exaggeration to say that we theorize today within 
the sound of guns. The old order has the picks of hundred rebellions thrust into its 
hide. (35)   
Gouldner held that social theory is needed to address these crises. This sense of 
rupture spurred renewed interest in classical social theory, which, as C. Wright 
Mills argued, offered the “big discourse” and sufficient purview to generate critical 
thought and debate over the historical directions and normative foundations of 
socio-political life. Theorists began to employ the classics in critiques of postwar 
capitalism and of modernization theories. Anthony Giddens (1971, p. vii) opened 
his highly influential study of classical theory with the assertion that many 
sociologists believe that: “contemporary social theory stands in need of radical 
revision,” which demands reconsidering sociology’s founding theorists. (36) Seeing 
social theory to be historically rooted and embedded in the wider culture, Gouldner 
and Giddens thought that re-engaging the classics would encourage critical 
rethinking of the present. Like Mills, they held that the rejection of normatively-
oriented, broad-scope social theory, or classical-type theory, leaves sociology without 
systematic means to illuminate and debate its normative and empirical directions 
and relations to wider culture and public life. (37) They hoped that attending to the 
best work in classical theory would generate fresh social theory of similar breadth 
and stir reflexivity and critical discourse about the bearings of specialized 
sociological research and sociological theory. This view of the classics was a driving 
force in the new phase of the Weber revival. Social critics’ and social theorists’ 
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strong normative emphasis was, however, in tension with Weber’s thought, and this 
same tension, although usually overlooked, characterized Marx-Weber fusions.  
Parsons’ Weber dominated the early postwar era, but as the liberal consensus 
eroded in the national political culture, many theorists attacked structural-
functionalism for being too static, ideological, and blind to fragmentation and 
conflict. Expanding upon Gerth’s and Mills’ Critical Weber, social theorists 
developed “conflict theories” or “critical sociologies,” which attacked Parsonsian 
theory and other mainstream sociological views. Marx-Weber fusions abounded. 
(38) However, they were part of a much broader, second postwar wave of Weber 
scholarship and Weberian sociology. More English-language translations of Weber’s 
original work appeared.(39)  The appearance of the full translation of Economy and 
Society ([1921] 1968) was an especially important event, helping fuel debate over 
Weber’s relationship to Marx. (40) However, co-editor and one of the work’s 
leading translators, Guenther Roth held that its nonpartisan, sociological thrust 
illustrated the divergence of Weber from Marx. In the introduction to a new edition 
of Reinhard Bendix’s Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, Roth implied that his 
mentor’s emphasis on Weber’s comparative-historical studies was a much needed 
corrective to Parsons’ Weber and antiliberal Weber as well as to Critical Weber. 
(41) Contributing substantially to the academic side of the Weber renaissance on 
both sides of the Atlantic, Roth criticized what he saw as politicized interpretations 
of Weber’s work. Many secondary works on Weber were translated, and many 
books and journal articles by younger and mid-career English-language Weber 
scholars appeared. By the 1980s, Weber scholarship became a cottage industry in 
Anglo-American sociology. (42) His ideas were also applied in diverse sociological 
subareas (e.g., comparative-historical sociology, the sociology of work, 
organizations, and economy, political sociology, rural sociology, sociology of 
religion). While having an increased presence in disciplinary work, social theory 
was emerging, as well as an independent practice. (43) Thus, Weber was inserted 
into important interdisciplinary theory debates over epistemological, cultural, and 
political issues. Marx-Weber fusions resonated with the times, stirred debate, and 
helped animate the wider Weber revival. 
Alvin Gouldner was a leading figure in the 1960s “new sociology,” which 
championed the type of theoretically guided and historically and politically engaged 
critical sociology that C.Wright Mills advocated.(44) According to Time Magazine 
(1970), new sociology overthrew the US “public image” of the sociologist as an 
irrelevant, obscurantist “pedant.” Marx-Weber fusions proliferated in the new 
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sociology. After youthful engagement with Marxism, Gouldner applied Weberian 
ideas centrally in his work. He deployed them to address the sociological deficit he 
saw in Marx’s thought.(45) Gouldner criticized overly partisan positions and 
appreciated empirical-historical sociology, but his widely-read “Anti-Minotaur” 
(1962) essay on Weber helped inspire new sociology critiques of scientism, 
technocracy, and militarism. Gouldner composed his major Marx-Weber fusion, 
during the 1970s (the last decade of his life). His massive, multiple volume project 
was arguably the broadest study of social theory by a later 20th century sociologist. 
He analyzed the historical roots of western social theory, framed an original theory 
of ideology and civil society, employed a linguistic turn to rethink contemporary 
class relations, provided a normative standard to guide social criticism, and created 
a basis for post-Marxist critical theory. His main contribution, however, was 
development of a theory of “social theory” (distinguished from middle-range theory 
and empirical sociological theory). He portrayed it as a primarily normatively-
oriented practice that justifies values, social movements, and socio-political regimes 
on the basis of their actual or possible social consequences. (46) In his view, social 
theory provides a post-traditional alternative to transcendental and absolutist ethics, 
opening normative matters to discussion and contestation and coming to terms with 
modern civil society’s pluralistic culture. Gouldner saw social theory as a potential 
language to debate the normative directions of social science and public life and to 
link the two realms. He engaged Marx and Weber throughout the project. Perhaps 
telling, he chose the title “Max Weber Research Professor of Social Theory” for his 
Distinguished Chair. However, Gouldner employed Weberian ideas to criticize 
Marxism, with the aim of reconstructing and reviving Marx’s vision of normatively-
driven critical social theory and, therefore, of going beyond what Weber believed 
was prudent and possible. 
In the 1970s, English-language translations of Frankfurt School and Western 
Marxist works proliferated, and interest in the topics grew explosively in North 
American, social theory circles. Most theorists, identified with these traditions, 
considered Weber to be the leading bourgeois theorist and rejected him on that 
basis. However, they often drew substantially, albeit usually tacitly, from his work 
on rationalization and bureaucratization and applied the ideas in critiques of 
orthodox Marxism, communism, sociology, and capitalism. By contrast, the leading 
second generation, Frankfurt School theorist, Jürgen Habermas employed Weber’s 
ideas much more directly and affirmatively than his critical theory predecessors. 
(47) As Parsons had done earlier, Habermas criticized and reconstructed Weber. 
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He meshed his Marx-Weber fusion with ideas from Durkheim, Mead, Parsons, and 
other theorists. Like Gouldner, he made a linguistic turn in an effort to fashion post-
Marxist critical theory. Habermas has refined his project for more than four 
decades, exerting enormous influence on interdisciplinary social theory. He has 
been a central figure in the era’s great debates over critical theory, liberalism, 
postmodernism, feminism, communitarianism, citizenship, and human rights. His 
ideas have been a major force in North American social theory. If Gouldner had not 
died suddenly and prematurely in1980, before his project was complete, he might 
have had wider impact on social theory. Gouldner and Habermas framed their own 
approaches, engaged many thinkers, and left tacit part of what they borrowed Marx 
and Weber. However, Marx-Weber fusions provided their works a critical thrust 
stressing the need to theorize democratic alternatives to existing socialism and 
capitalism. 
In the 1970s, Telos was the leading North American outlet for Frankfurt School and 
Western Marxist thought. The Telos circle debated and published diverse types of 
earlier 20th century and contemporary work, with the aim of reconstructing critical 
theory and providing an alternative to the old left and the New Left. Lukács’ Marx-
Weber fusion and homogenization-regimentation thesis were discussed widely in the 
early years of the journal. Gouldner and Habermas later published in Telos. (48) 
However, chief editor, Paul Piccone believed that they did not break sharply 
enough from Marxism or from conventional philosophy and sociology and, thus, 
failed to grasp the depth of the exhaustion of leftist thought and of the wider culture. 
Declaring a “crisis of one-dimensionality,” Piccone portrayed total instrumental 
rationalization and bureaucratization, which annihilated otherness, liquidated 
cultural particularity, eliminated political opposition, and foreclosed democratic 
change. According to his “artificial negativity” thesis, the welfare state and left-
liberal activism and reform simulate progressive change, tame radical impulses, and 
empower “New-Class” apparachnicks, who impose total administration. (49) Such 
extreme versions of the homogenization-regimentation thesis can lead, as they did in 
the Weimar era, to radical turns left or right. Piccone’s search for “organic 
negativity” led Telos, in the 1980s and 1990s, to engage Carl Schmitt, Italy’s 
Northern League, and the French New Right in a friendly manner and to embark 
on a politically ambiguous “postmodern populist” path. Piccone scathingly 
dismissed Marx and Weber as obsolete thinkers, but he engaged their ideas and 
employed them centrally, although tacitly, in his own theory. (50)  
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Pierre Bourdieu’s views on “cultural capital” focused on the intersection of class 
and status, borrowed heavily from Marx and Weber, and framed a cultural turn in 
critical theory.(51) English-language translations of his works and commentaries 
about them helped stimulate the rise of a new, North American sociology of culture 
and contributed to interdisciplinary cultural studies. Other thinkers employed 
Weber against Marx-Weber fusions and critical theory. Jeffery Alexander’s (1982-
83)  multi-volume tome revived the Parsons-Weber fusion. He stimulated  
neofunctionalist work, which drew criticism from the left and from Weberians. 
Convergent with Habermas, he opposed the homogenization-regimentation thesis, 
and affirmed progressive liberalism. Other theorists attacked progressive liberals 
and post-1960s liberalized American culture. For example, conservative, social 
theorist, Robert Nisbet deployed a Durkheim-Weber fusion against the liberal-left. 
Peter L. Berger’s work on modernity, religion, and disenchantment fused Weberian 
themes with ideas from Alfred Schutz, Mannheim, Marx, Durkheim, and others. 
Berger was always ambivalent about modernity and opposed to the left, but his 
Invitation to Sociology (1963) and co-authored study on the sociology of knowledge 
were widely-read nonpartisan works. By the mid-1970s, however, he made his 
strenuous opposition to Marxism, critical theory, and the New Left clearly evident. 
He castigated new sociologists’ value-laden ways as part of his own emphatic 
political and normative arguments for religion, tradition, and capitalism. Former 
new sociologist, turned neoconservative, Irving Louis Horowitz also applied 
Weberian ideas against Marxism, the left, and progressive liberalism. Like Berger, 
he invoked value freedom against their partisanship in the same pages that he posed 
his own strongly partisan arguments. (52) Former leftist, Christopher Lasch and left-
leaning Richard Sennett also deployed Weberian themes to challenge liberal 
modernization theories. Lasch’s and Sennett’s politics and normative views diverged 
from Nisbet, Berger, and Horowitz, but they all framed homogenization-
regimentation theses, portraying erosion of the Protestant work ethic, exhaustion of 
the postwar liberal-left, and depletion of wider American culture. They also 
criticized liberal views of secularization and de-traditionalization. However, they did 
not break as radically with liberalism as Piccone. (53) Gouldner also turned  
pessimistic. He ended the last work completed during his lifetime with the chapter, 
“Nightmare Marxism,” holding that late-1970s events upheld Weber’s views about 
the failure of socialism, triumph of capitalism, and tenuous nature of liberal 
democracy (Gouldner [1980] 1982c, pp. 380-89). By the mid-1980s, Marx-Weber 
fusions faded in the face rightward social and political trends and new forms of 
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2.2. Postmodern Weber: Nietzsche-Weber Syntheses  
 
In the 1980s, interdisciplinary debates about modernity and postmodernity 
intensified in response to major socio-political and technical shifts (e.g., withered 
communism and national liberation movements, ascendent Thatcherism-Reaganism, 
deregulation, deindustrialization, new information-communication technologies, and 
struggles over national and cultural identity). Postmodernists held that entirely new 
theoretical and political practices were needed to come to terms with the nascent 
postmodern order. Their claims about the “end of modernity” expressed, in an 
exaggerated way, erosion of the postwar system and, specifically, decline of its chief 
mode of legitimation - progress through modernization. Postmodernism subsumed 
diverse approaches with varying relations to modern social theory (Antonio 1998). 
Postmodernists usually operated in the tracks of modernity discourse; their views of 
technocracy, discipline, cultural exhaustion, and negative critique or 
“deconstruction” were reminiscent of the Frankfurt School. Milder versions of their 
critical views about representation, objectivity, and perspectivism had affinity for 
Weber’s methodological essays. But radical postmodernists attributed a sweepingly 
deterministic primacy to language (often detached from history and society), 
embraced irrationalism, and quit modern social theory. Yet even moderate 
postmodernists rejected Marx-Weber syntheses; they attacked materialism and 
scientism and portrayed Marxists as retrograde “totalizers,”who justified 
technocracy, ignored noneconomic oppression, trivialized culture, and legitimated 
bloody revolutions and authoritarianism. Giving voice to a new “cultural 
left”embracing flourishing, “post-Marxist,” “new social movements” (e.g., feminist, 
gay/lesbian, and racial/ethnic politics),  postmodernists argued that Marxism’s labor-
centered, class politics were obsolescent and had been superceded by struggles for 
recognition. (55) Cultural theorists, mostly from the humanities, engaged a flood of 
translations of French poststructuralist and deconstructionist works and related 
postmodern commentaries and critiques. North American versions of 
postmodernism and deconstruction were deployed in culture wars over 
multiculturalism and were the focus of intense generational battles in Philosophy, 
English, and Comparative Literature Departments. In related sociological circles, 
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enthusiasm for classical theory dimmed, and sociological theory’s Marx-Weber-
Durkheim canon was attacked by feminist, minority, and other, usually younger, 
sociologists for being Eurocentric and phallocentric, perpetuating the discipline’s 
old guard, and suppressing fresh thought and new thinkers. This “holy trinity” 
became the “dead white males,” later emblazed on T-shirts at the annual American 
Sociological Association meetings. Still Nietzsche-Weber fusions proliferated in the 
new political and cultural context. However, the social science side of postmodernist 
discourse took place mostly outside the mainstream journals and on the margins of 
formal disciplinary circles or beyond them. Debates over postmodernism extended 
beyond academe, and furthered social theory’s emergence as an independent 
discipline.   
Postmodernist arguments about rationalization’s homogenizing and regimenting 
force were influenced heavily by the postwar, French reception of Heidegger’s 
thought, especially his critique of technology and interpretation of Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche is the most important forerunner of  postmodernism; he raged against 
western rationality’s excesses and declared that the end of modernity was at hand. 
Postmodernists often acknowledged passingly his influence on them, but he usually 
had a larger tacit presence in their works. Frankfurt School-like, Weberian themes 
also suffused postmodernism, although they usually were left implicit, mentioned 
passingly, or mixed with other thinkers’ views. (56) For example, the 
homogenization-regimentation thesis had a central place in Michel Foucault’s work; 
his “carceral system” and “normalization” paralleled Marcuse’s “repressive 
administration of society” (Foucault 1978, Marcuse 1964). Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1983, p. 166) contended that Foucault took up Weber’s “concern with 
rationalization and objectification as the essential trend of our culture and the most 
important problem of our time.” Foucault acknowledged his affinity with Weber and 
the Frankfurt School, but he asserted that his generation of French theorists, as 
younger scholars, did not read these thinkers and that any influence was indirect 
(Foucault 1989, pp. 241-43). Foucault stressed Heidegger’s major impact on his 
thought, saying that he “probably wouldn’t have read Nietzsche if... [he] hadn’t 
read Heidegger.” Concluding that “Nietzsche prevailed,” Foucault declared that he 
was “simply a Nietzschean” (1989, pp. 326-27).  However, Foucault (1989, p. 
239) also acknowledged Georges Baitaille as a major influence on his thought and 
another important source of his Nietzscheanism. Baitaille read Nietzsche and Weber 
and blended their ideas with his own in the1930s. The extent of the Nietzsche-
Weber fusion in the thought of postmodernism’s French founders is an open 
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question and a detective story. Their 1970s and 1980s, English-speaking 
interpreters and appropriators, however, had been exposed to the fusion, especially 
via the Frankfurt School, and often read postmodernism through that lens. (57)  
Mike Gane (2002, p. 4) described an “implicit dialogue” between Weber and 
postmodern theory (i.e., Lyotard, Foucault, and Baudrillard), and offered detailed 
analyses of multiple points of convergence, including prominent Nietzschean 
threads. Paralleling Weber’s views, Gane argued, postmodernists addressed 
centrally rationalization’s leveling and regimenting tendencies. However, he held 
that their “transgressive,” antirationalist moves resisted processes that Weber 
deemed inevitable and legitimated. Gane deployed a Nietzschean-Weberian, 
homogenization-regimentation thesis to argue that postmodernists superceded 
Weber’s views.(58) William Bogart’s (1996)  Baudrillardian-Foucaultian description 
of “telematic” surveillance provided a grim, wired vision of total administration in 
which efforts to reform or resist it politically simply enhance its power. He claimed 
to have updated Weber’s argument about instrumental rationalization, but his 
portrayal of postmodern “hypercontrol” is more reminiscent of Piccone’s “artificial 
negativity” thesis. By contrast to Piccone’s “organic negativity” and populist politics, 
however, Bogart advocated political indifference.(59) Gane’s and Bogert’s 
Nietzschean-Weberian, homogenization-regimentation theses heralded postwar 
modernization theory’s exhaustion, but they exemplify divergent threads of 
postmodernism. Gane considered postmodernist theory to be a method and 
language to resist homogenization-regimentation and advance postmodern politics. 
Treating postmodernism as a progressive advance over modernization theory, he 
retained ties to critical theory and liberal-democratic politics. By contrast, Bogart’s 
description of terminal evaporation of modernity’s socio-cultural bases and of its 
liberal-democratic potentials and his endorsement of extreme ennui open the way to 
anti-modern and anti-liberal countermoves. Taking a very different direction, 
postmodernist, Zygmunt Bauman employed a Weberian homogenization-
regimentation thesis to theorize the roots of the Holocaust. He held that modern 
bureaucracy’s instrumentally rationalized power, dutiful officials, and amoral 
functionality opened the way for genocide - i.e., the Holocaust was a “hidden 
possibility” of modernity. (60) 
Critics also deployed Weber’s ideas against postmodernism; they held that his 
scaled-down views of rationality and science offer a desirable alternative to its 
relativist irrationalism (e.g., Raynaud 1997, pp. 148-52). Daniel Bell’s (1976) 
trenchant critique of postmodern culture bore a clear imprint of Marx and Weber, 
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but it also expressed a strong Nietzschean side. Bell’s Marxian-Weberian themes 
are clearly visible in his arguments about capitalism’s rationalized, disenchanted, 
bureaucratized features, while Nietzschean elements are just as apparent in his 
portrayal of postmodern culture’s aesceticism, fragmentation, and immediacy. 
Similar themes appear throughout Fredric Jameson’s (1984) and in David Harvey’s 
(1989) influential analyses of  postmodern culture. They engaged postmodernism 
more affirmatively than Bell, but they neither celebrated it nor treated it as a 
finality. They believed that Marxist theory could be revised to address postmodern 
tendencies and that it was, in fact, needed to grasp them and overcome their 
contradictions. Like Bell, they articulated postmodernism’s Nietzschean sensibilities 
in a largely Marx-Weber synthesis that remained within orbit of modern social 
theory and retained, at least, modest hopes to revive the progressive side of postwar 
modernization. (61) 
Alan Bloom’s best seller, Closing of the American Mind (1987) was a major 
broadside in the neoconservative attack on postmodern culture and on the 
ascendant cultural left. (62)  He held that rampant postmodern sensibilities manifest 
America’s “worst instincts” and hasten a cultural crisis (Bloom 1987, p. 379). 
Bloom argued that French deconstructionism’s heavy influence on the 1980s, US 
left caused them to drop Marx for Heidegger and Nietzsche and, consequently, 
embrace extreme cultural relativism and nihilism (Bloom 1987, pp. 217-26). Like 
Bell, Bloom believed that postmodernism justified postwar consumer culture’s 
release from normative constraint and fanned already excessive carnal appetites and 
philistine individualism. He argued that the postwar US reception of Weber made 
him the “intermediary between Nietzsche and us Americans” and ultimate source of 
the receptivity to European Heideggerianism and extremism left and right (Bloom 
1987, pp. 195). He claimed that Weber’s “dogmatic atheism,” expressed in his 
analysis of the Protestant ethic, injected Nietzscheanism into the “American 
Bloodstream.” Although implying that the late-1960s shift from Parsons’ Weber to 
Critical Weber was also an important step, Bloom contended that post-Marxist, 
Nietzsche-Weber syntheses made the US receptive to postmodernism (Bloom 1987, 
pp. 147- 151,  208-16). However, Blooms’ portrayal of leveled values and extreme 
cultural exhaustion converged with the so-called Heideggerian left’s views. (63) His 
argument parallel’s his mentor Leo Strauss’ earlier critique of Weber and anti-
liberal Nietzsche-Weber synthesis. Bloom and other late 20th century Straussians 
helped shape the cultural right and neoconservative versions of the homogenization-
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regimentation thesis that later had greater force and blossomed politically, during 
the George W. Bush presidency. 
 
 
2.3. Weber’s Shadow in the Age of Globalization: Modernization Theory Redux and it 
Critics 
 
By the early-1990s, postmodernist works sold briskly at Borders and Barnes and 
Noble bookstores. Postmodernism had become a “cultural dominant” in the 
humanities and specialty niche in sociological theory. However, the freer movement 
of goods, capital, images, and people across national borders, neoliberal 
restructuring, and geopolitical realignment (following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc 
and first Gulf War) helped stir a shift in interdisciplinary social theory discourse to 
US-led “globalization.” Francis Fukuyama’s much publicized “end of history” thesis 
appeared at the moment that the Soviet Bloc was collapsing and pro-democracy 
protest was raging in China (Fukuyama 1989). He charged that procapitalist, 
modernization theory, fashioned by postwar US Weberians, crashed after relativist, 
leftist, social scientists lambasted its alleged Eurocentric bias. However, Fukuyama 
declared that modernization theory was more convincing in1990 than it was twenty 
years before, when it came under attack (Fukuyama 1992, pp. 68-9, 133-134). He 
vindicated the Parsonsian equation of Americanization and modernization, but 
stripped of its postwar, liberal emphases on regulation and redistribution. (64) He 
held that this leaner, neoliberal vision of modernization now rules among all people 
who want to be modern; they cannot imagine an alternative regime that would 
“represent a fundamental improvement over our current order” (Fukuyama 1992, 
p. 51). Qualifying his optimism, however, Fukuyama warned that neoliberalism’s 
prosaic economism could not satisfy humanity’s Nietzschean desire for glory or to 
be recognized as superior. He held that a modest  revival of religious and patriotic 
sentiments could infuse the neoliberal world with meaning and civic spirit and 
defuse neopopulist and neofascist threats. His Nietzsche-Weber synthesis justified 
the neoconservative alliance between economic and cultural conservatives and their 
shared view that American New Deal liberalism and European-style Social 
Democracy are exhausted. (65) 
Endings discourses proliferated in Fukuyama’s wake - diverse social theorists 
praised or bemoaned the neoliberal “end of alternatives,” “end of left and right,” or 
“end of politics” (66). “Third Way”theorists, like Anthony Giddens, held that free-
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market reform streamlines social democracy to better accommodate to globalization 
and its more interdependent, cosmopolitan, and democratic “reflexive modernity” 
or “second modernity” (67) They retained Weberian ideas, but their enthusiasm for 
the free-market severed ties to Nietzsche and suggested a nascent Smith-Weber 
fusion (68). In unabashed, effusive celebration of deregulated capitalism, Third 
Way or Clinton “New Democrat,” Thomas L. Friedman (2000) argued that 
neoliberal globalization’s “Golden Straightjacket” enriches societies by strictly 
subordinating politics to markets or, in his words, by reducing political options to 
choices between “Pepsi and Coke.” Like homogenization-regimentation theorists, he 
described neoliberal globalization’s all-encompassing instrumental rationalization, 
but he consecrated the process as revolutionary progress. Like Parsons, Friedman 
declared the US to be lead-society of modernization’s new phase. In his view, US 
neoliberalism’s on-line, de-regulated, stockholders’ democracy “blew away all the 
major ideological alternatives to free-market capitalism” (Friedman, pp. 103, 106).  
Friedman’s best-seller mirrored  the soaring optimism of the enlarged, affluent, 
“roaring 90s,” US “investor class.” Modernization theory and end of ideology 
discourse ruled again, but the neoliberal versions diverged from postwar 
modernization theories’ emphases on planning, welfare, and just meritocracy (69). 
Although “globalization” became the master discourse of interdisciplinary social 
theory,  the shift did not diminish the importance of postmodern cultural 
representation, hybridization, fragmentation, homogenization, and retribalization. 
George Ritzer’s highly accessible works on global consumer culture have been 
among the best selling sociology books in the US and around the globe. Employing 
directly Weber’s theories of bureaucratization and rationalization, his 
“McDonaldization” thesis portrayed hyper-rationalization of  the global consumer 
sector and consequent homogenization and regimentation. Ritzer fused threads from 
Marx and critical theory with Weberian themes. Postmodern culture and 
postmodernist theory have a substantial presence in his work, but he implied that 
these tendencies and globalization constitute a fresh phase of modernization. (70) 
Benjamin Barber’s (1996) widely-read study about the entwinement of globalized, 
US popular culture (“McWorld”) with “retribalized” nationalist, populist, and 
traditionalist movements (“Jihad”) made only passing references to Weber or Marx, 
but themes from the two theorists’ are visible in the work. (71) Like Ritzer, Barber 
deployed a moderate liberal-democratic version of the homogenization-
regimentation thesis to criticize US “monoculture’s” neutralization of particularity. 
Both theorists, however, acknowledged that key facets of local culture survive and 
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leave strong imprints in hybridized cultural products. The two theorists engage 
globalization’s culturally progressive features and postmodern facets. However, 
Ritzer focused mainly on consumption and related cultural matters, and did not 
address closely  the neoliberal policy regime. By contrast, Barber framed his 
analysis of postmodern images and consumption as part of a critique of 
neoliberalism calling for increased regulation by nation states and by transnational 
civil society. Barber meshed his Weberian vision of cultural rationalization with a 
Deweyan emphasis on democratic publics and socially and culturally embedded 
markets. 
Theorists have debated heatedly the degree to which globalization weakens the 
state’s regulatory powers and the consequences and inevitability of the alleged 
erosion. Even scholars, who counter excessive claims about the state’s eclipse, 
concede that globalization has reduced its capacity to control its internal and 
external environments. For example, Bauman (1998) and Giddens (2000) have 
argued that global markets and global production limit substantially and make much 
more problematic state sovereignty. However, Bauman’s description of consequent 
polarized economies and criminalized underclasses offers a much darker vision of 
globalization than Giddens’ cheery, albeit qualified, portrayal of the rise of a 
detraditionalized, democratized “global cosmopolitan society.” Both theorists 
agreed, however, that neoliberal globalization’s beneficial or desired consequences 
make it  “unstoppable.” By contrast John Gray (1999) and Pierre Bourdieu and 
Loïc Wacquant (1999) held that globalization advocates attribute universal 
significance to a parochial process that has US origins and that depends on, for its 
reproduction, American cultural, economic, and political imperialism. They 
portrayed  neoliberal globalization as a US state project that has largely destructive 
consequences and that should be resisted. Manuel Castells’ sweeping portrayal of 
the postmodern “informational economy,” “network organization” and “virtual 
culture” acknowledges that globalization has eroded some facets of postwar political 
regulation, but explains that states execute neoliberal policy, coordinate and provide 
infrastructure for global interchanges, and subsidize capitalism. In his view, 
neoliberal globalization builds on the logic and institutional matrix of earlier 
modernization and the new order is “more” capitalist than ever before. (72) 
Presuming this continuity, Castells argued that Weber’s “theoretical principles” are 
still excellent tools to engage the changes and new regime.(73) Regardless of 
disagreements over globalization’s nature and consequences, the various theorists, 
discussed in this paragraph, imply that capitalism drives globalization. Continuing 
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capitalism-centered modernization discourse, they still operate in the shadow of 
Marx-Weber fusions. 
Other theorists decouple globalization and modernization and decenter the 
relationship between globalization and capitalism. (74) For example, Weber 
scholar, Martin Albrow (1997) portrayed “globality.”as an epochal rupture from 
“modernity.” He contended that an entirely new global cultural, political, and social 
complex is emergent and that modern social theories, with their bankrupt 
Eurocentric presuppositions, obscure vision of it and blunt imagination about its 
possibilities. Albrow argued that capitalist economic change does not drive 
globalization, but is a subordinate part of a much more “comprehensive social 
transformation.” Rejecting claims about capitalism’s axial status, he aimed to move 
beyond Marx and Weber (Albow 1997, pp. 4-6, 85-90, 168-83, and passim). Yet 
Albrow’s repeated dismissals of  modernity and modern social theory preserve them 
as a backdrop and illustrate their embeddedness in globalization discourse and how 
difficult they are to break from entirely. Like extreme market-centered globalization 
analysts, however, he held that globality terminally weakens all states, even that of 
the US. Consequently, he contended that theorists should scuttle classical theory’s 
core concept of  “nation-state society,” which Weber framed and justified. Such 




2.4. The Age of Tribalism:  Schmitt-Weber Syntheses and Friend-Enemy Politics 
 
In the early postwar era, Wolfgang Mommsen charged that Weber’s ideas of 
plebiscitary leadership and legal-rational legitimacy helped inspire Carl Schmitt’s 
antiparlimentary and anti-liberal views, which justified Nazi dictatorship. During the 
postwar de-Nazification, Mommsen charged, German scholars ignored this 
connection because they did not want to address Weber’s nationalist or elitist 
themes. He also implied that Parsons’ influence on postwar German thought helped 
cultivate a one-sided, liberal-democratic view of Weber. Although Mommsen’s 
position has been contested, Weberian facets are transparent in Schmitt’s work. 
(75) Stressing liberalism’s exhaustion, Schmitt’s version of the Weber-influenced 
homogenization-regimentation thesis has had major impact on several generations of 
diverse thinkers. International interest in Schmitt has grown substantially in recent 
decades, stirred by globalization and erosion of postwar geopolitical arrangements, 
  
23 
which also helped generate Nietzsche-Weber fusions. Thinkers from right and left 
have combined Schmittean-Weberian themes with ideas from Nietzsche, Marx, and 
other theorists. They hold that Schmitt was prescient about today’s ongoing 
geopolitical changes - porous territorial borders, weakened nation-states, and global 
US dominance -  and that he provided unique analytical resources to criticize 
outmoded postwar modernization theories, address fundamental socio-cultural 
changes still in motion, and imagine new forms of theory and politics (e.g., Mouffe 
1999). Resonating with today’s intense neotribal politics,  Schmitt’s “friend and 
enemy” dichotomy  has become especially poignant after 9/11 (76).  
Schmitt held that political community and collective identity necessitate shared 
culture, which binds most powerfully when it is experienced against the backdrop of 
an “other” or “stranger” who personifies “evil”- a “public enemy” who represents 
an opposed culture and threat to one’s way of life. Schmitt held that: “high points of 
politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, 
recognized as the enemy” (1996, p.67). Seeing liberal pluralism to preclude such 
clarity and unity, he rejected liberalism’s conflictive values, market-centeredness, 
deracinated individuals, and  multicultural citizenship, or, in his words, its “entire 
system of demilitarized and depoliticized concepts” (Schmitt 1996, p 71). He 
considered the friend-enemy dichotomy’s “grand politics”to be the bulwark against 
globalizing Anglo-American capitalism and its “possessive individualism,” which he 
thought neutralize particularity, fragment culture, and shatter community. He 
unhinged liberalism from democracy. However, Schmitt considered democracy to 
be simply “an identity of governed and governing” based on shared culture and, 
therefore, compatible with Fascist or Bolshevik dictatorship (Schmitt 1988b, pp. 
10-17, 90, notes 26 and 28, 91 note 32).  He contended that liberal-democratic 
pluralism must be defeated at the national level to preserve a “pluriverse” of 
culturally distinct nations. He also held that universalistic claims about spreading 
democracy and extending human rights justify cultural homogenization and Anglo-
American imperialism. Arguing that divergent national cultures are 
incommensurable, Schmitt held that cross-cultural communication and cooperation 
are limited to closely related peoples. Although dismissing Weber’s liberalism and 
warnings about mass politics, Schmitt’s skepticism about the creation of 
transnational cultural consensus and his warnings about the cultural consequences 
of capitalism’s instrumental rationality and technical rationality draw on Weberian 
themes. 
Starting in the late-1980s, the Telos Circle turned to Schmitt, deploying his concepts 
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in acid critiques of liberalism and in support of neopopulism and federalism (e.g., 
Telos 72 (Summer 1987), 83 (Spring 1990); 85 (Fall 1990); 102 (Winter 1995); 
109 (Fall 1996); 122 (Winter 2002); Wolin 1990b; Strong 1996; Müller 2003). 
They held that his ideas can be used to formulate alternatives to the failed left and 
failed right. Regular Telos author and leading French New Right theorist, Alain de 
Benoist posed a Schmittean-Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis that 
declared liberalism and the entire liberal-democratic nation-state system to be 
moribund. Drawing on the ancient idea of “empire,” he advocated replacing the 
European state system with a loosely-coupled federated regime of self-governing 
units in which full citizenship would be based on shared culture and common 
identity. He embraced Schmitt’s argument that culturally homogenous 
communitarian regimes favor a “democratic” unity of leader and mass. He held that 
local participation and direct democracy, anchored in community, would replace 
liberal-democratic politics. Benoist did not articulate the political and legal 
institutions of the new regime. However, Benoist argued that the imperial regime 
would put Europe on a new path that escapes cultural and political fragmentation 
and consequent subordination to the “American superpower” (1993-4).  
Telos associate editor, paleoconservative Schmittean, Paul Gottfried argued that a 
progressive-liberal “New Class,” operating in US government offices, higher 
education, corporations, and social movement organizations, wield “political 
correctness” as a weapon, manipulating welfare, human rights, and multicultural 
ideas and policies to eliminate enemies and exert overarching cultural and political 
hegemony. He held that left-leaning public intellectuals created a house of bondage 
based on therapeutic justifications. Converging with Piccone’s vision of total 
administration, Gottfried’s paleoconservative critique of the “managerial state” 
employed an extreme homogenization-regimentation thesis that constructed liberals 
as the internal enemy. Although warning that this liberal regime could be further 
consolidated and even extended into a global domination system, Gottfried declared 
that it is unleashing severe disintegrative forces and is stirring populist resistence, 
which could forge a post-liberal Schmittian scenario (1999b, p 140). 
Schmitt-Weber fusions stress limits to communication and to diffusion of knowledge, 
which preclude wider or more participatory democracy. Such views counter 
Albrow’s vision of emergent global democracy and Barber’s argument about 
development of global civil society. Samuel Huntington’s best-seller, The Clash of 
Civilizations expresses a strong Schmittean-Weberian current. Like Weber, 
Huntington saw religion to be a root of enduring civilizational differences (77). He 
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held that incommensurate cultures prevent universalization of western democracy 
and generate friend-enemy dynamics. Although acknowledging that commonalities 
ought to be sought, Huntington contended that it “is human to hate” and that 
“people need enemies” to define and motivate themselves (1997, p. 130). He 
implied that Chinese authoritarianism and Islamic antimodernism are the West’s 
chief enemies. (78) To maintain global leadership and defend the West’s unique 
democratic culture, he argued, the US must dispense with multiculturalism at home 
and build cultural unity around its democratic institutions (Huntington 1997, pp. 
125-30, 218-38, 304-08, 318). 
Stephen Turner (2003) employed a self-identified Schmittian-Weberian fusion to 
explore knowledge-based limits to democratization. He concurred with Schmitt’s 
views that rational persuasion and discussion are central to liberal-democratic 
ideals, but are not realized in liberal democracies. Turner countered Habermas and 
other left-liberal theorists who advocate creating stronger democracy by building 
vibrant civil societies, which improve the quality and reach of cultural and political 
communication. Besides the demagogic facets of mass democracies stressed by 
Weber and Schmitt, Turner held that the preeminent role of scientific expertise and 
highly specialized technical knowledge, today, effectively precludes average citizens 
from ever grasping sufficiently complex public problems  (e.g., global warming) and 
competently communicating about them and judging them. In his view, expert-
based “knowledge organizations” or “commissions” now set policy in government, 
business, and social movement organizations and, thus, expert discourse supplants 
public dialogue, bankrupting progressive liberal notions of popular sovereignty and 
discursive democracy. Arguably, Turner updated Walter Lippmann’s elite theory of 
liberal democracy.(79) However, Turner did not say if his vision of commission-
dominated “democracy” calls for “democratic” reform, points to a fundamental 
crisis that demands regime change, or suggests a condition impervious to change. 
As should be apparent from the discussion above, Schmitt-Weber fusions diverged 
in their evaluations of existent liberal democratic politics and regimes. Still 
Schmittean-Weberian homogenization-regimentation theses posed major questions 
about the vitality of liberal-democracy and, especially, about neoliberal 
globalization. In particular, New Right, paleoconservative, and conservative 
Schmitteans rejected deregulated global markets and transnational regulatory, 
redistributive, or human rights regimes. They dismissed hopes that increased global 
economic intercourse would lead to socio-cultural and political interdependence. 
These Schmitteans held that globalization deepened liberal democracy’s already 
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profound contradictions or exhausted the regime and called for a regime change. 
But nearly all Schmitt-Weber fusions suggested a severe erosion and legitimacy 
crisis of postwar liberal democracies.    
 
 
2.5. Twilight of the Postwar Era; Post-9/11 Schmitteanism, Terror, and the Camps 
  
The bitterly contested presidential race between George W. Bush and Al Gore, 
decided ultimately by the Supreme Court, polarized the nation and intensified  
friend-enemy dichotomies among party members and among politically interested 
segments of the US populace, who knew nothing about Schmitt. However, the Bush 
Administration’s dominant neoconservative activists and intellectuals often have 
been exposed to Strauss and his students. Weberian threads are interwoven with 
Straussian and Schmittean currents in their thought, deriving sometimes from direct 
knowledge of the two theorists, but likely more often from readings of writers 
influenced by them (e.g., such as Morgenthau, Huntington, and Fukuyama). The 
degree of Schmittean influence is a matter of debate, but the Bush administration 
has employed friend-enemy strategies at home and abroad. (80) It first positioned 
China as the chief US enemy. Tensions between the two nations were obvious after 
a collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a US spy plane (on what some 
policymakers saw as a provocative mission on the edge of China’s airspace). But 
after 9/11, Islamist radicals became the main US enemy. The Bush Administration 
characterized its “War on Terror” and “Iraq War” as major beachheads in a US-led 
struggle of the “civilized world” against “rogue states” and, especially, against the 
“axis of evil” (i.e., Iran, Iraq, and North Korea). However, the US’ European allies 
and core western states were split over the policies. Secretary of State Donald 
Rumsfeld’s inflammatory comments about “New Europe” (i.e, supporters of US 
Iraq policy) versus “Old Europe” (i.e., France and Germany, who opposed the war) 
and Donald Kegan’s widely-read, provocative justification of US unilaterialism and 
pre-emptive strikes (i.e., American power and European weakness necessitate the 
policies) intensified the split. Invoking former Secretary of State, Madeline 
Albright’s claim that the US is the “indispensable nation,” Kegan declared that the 
US aspiration “to play a grand role in the world” is merited because it is the lone 
superpower and because Americans’ believe (i.e., with good cause) that their 
founding principles are “unquestionably superior” to those of all other nations 
throughout history (2003, pp. 85-103). Seeking mass support for military 
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interventions, the Bush administration and its supporters also have invoked the old 
rhetoric of “American Exceptionalism”; US global leadership derives from its 
covenant with God and consequent moral leadership. They deploy claims about 
seeking God’s consul and serving his will especially to mobilize the evangelical 
“base” of the Republican Party and to consecrate friend-enemy dichotomies applied 
at home and abroad. 
Before 9/11, Chalmers Johnson (2000) argued presciently that “American Empire” 
has generated global hostility and violent counter-responses. (81)  He and other 
Bush Administration critics now hold that US-led globalization, combined with post-
9/11 unilateralism, militarism, and torture scandals, have helped generate anti-
American, friend-enemy binaries that construct Americans as the unwelcome Other 
and the US as the “Evil Empire.” (See Bull 2005; Johnson 2004; Chua 2004, and 
Pew Center “Global Attitudes Surveys”, http://pewresearch.org/trends).  During and 
after the bitterly fought 2004 Bush-Kerry presidential election, which hardened the 
divide of the year 2000 election, the US media reported a sharp cultural and 
political polarization between the so-called “red states and blue states,” implying 
that friend-enemy dichotomies divide Americans as well as the US and the rest of 
the world. For over two decades “liberals” have been attacked incessantly by very 
well funded right-wing foundations representing neoconservative, conservative, and 
religious-right interests (e.g., The Heritage Foundation). Their well-publicized 
broadsides have been so successful that even the progressive wing of the 
Democratic Party has shed the liberal label. Although the right has had the upper 
hand, bitter opposition has been building among liberals and Democrats since the 
Reagan Administration and is being intensified in opposition to George W. Bush’s 
policies. After 9/11, right-wing critics charged that liberals and especially the 
“liberal press” forged the “permissive” climate that made the US vulnerable to the 
terrorist attacks and that liberal criticism of the Iraq War and War on Terror 
undermined support for and morale of the troops. Right-wing Americans treat 
“liberals” as the internal enemy, while liberal-left Americans (and even many 
centrist Democrats) see the Bush Administration and its hard-right Republican base, 
in a similar light, as a sort of domestic “Evil Empire”.(82) The influence of Schmitt 
is debatable, but the affinity of his ideas for the current climate is had to dispute. 
The 9/11 events brought another Schmittean dichotomy to the foreground - the 
normal situation versus the “state of emergency” or “state of exception.” Defining 
the sovereign as the person who is able to declare a state of emergency and exercise 
total power, Schmitt argued that state power is rooted in decision not in legal norms. 
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He held that the state of exception, becomes the rule.(83) After 9/11, President 
Bush asserted his role as “Commander in Chief” in the “War on Terror,” holding 
that he would employ any measures necessary to catch or kill terrorists. The tragic 
images of the attack on the World Trade Center, replayed repeatedly on TV, the 
Anthrax scare, and a media saturated with flag lapels and talk of terrorism affirmed 
to most Americans a borderless war that threatened the “homeland” (a new term in 
US political discourse). In this climate, the Bush Administration was able to pass the 
US Patriot Act, suspend rule of law for undocumented aliens and suspected 
terrorists, put aside Geneva Convention rules for accused enemy combatants, 
transfer detainees to the Guantánamo camp, where they could be held indefinitely 
without recourse to US law and constitutional rights, and send others to undisclosed 
locations around the globe (i.e., “extraordinary rendition”) with lax human rights 
policies and experienced torturers. The crisis mentality was perpetuated by the 
brutal Iraq War, images of beheadings on Internet, repeated terror warnings from 
the new Office of Homeland Security, and constant media attention about the US at 
war and possible attacks at home, looming on the horizon. Many of the policies 
passed with bipartisan support. The summer 2005, London terrorist bombings 
helped sustain the US sense of vulnerability. Americans have had polarized views of 
President Bush and the Iraq War, but elected officials and ordinary citizens have 
not mounted sustained resistence to extralegal measures. American criticism of the 
Guantánamo internment camp and torture at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere has been 
tame and countered by assertions that the abuses have been trivial or even justified. 
The lawyer Alberto Gonzales, who provided the Bush Administration possible legal 
justifications favoring relaxed rules against torture, was appointed US Attorney 
General! (Whitlock 2005, on rendition; Sengupta and Masood 2005, on how 
Muslims’ have come to perceive the US through the Guantánamo internment camp; 
White 2005, on new “Human Rights Watch” charges of abuse). As I write, pent up 
progressive liberal and minority group hostility is being expressed openly and 
emphatically against Bush Administration’s slow initial response to the victims of 
Hurricane Katrina. They accuse the President of failing to act like a Commander in 
Chief, in a State of Emergency that imperiled the poor, infirm, and black. (84) 
Paleoconservative and left-leaning Schmitteans have attacked the Bush 
Administration and neoconservatives for employing universal claims about 
spreading democracy and protecting human rights to justify imperialist 
interventions, neoliberal globalization, and US-imprinted cultural homogenization. 
Left-Schmittean, Giorgio Agamben employed the idea of a state of exception to 
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criticize the concentration of state power, rather than to affirm it in the fashion of 
Schmitt.(85) Agamben’s fusion of Schmitt with Benjamin, Foucault, Arendt, and 
others manifests threads of a Weberian homogenization-regimentation thesis (likely 
derived from the theories he appropriated). (86) Posing the argument before 9/11, 
Agamben (1998) held that the growth of government power over the individual and 
its extralegal mechanisms and violence make the state of exception the normal state 
of affairs today and that the concentration camp is the dominant political model. His 
recent work situates Bush Administration policy in the long-term development of 
this repressive regime (Agamben 2005). Critics argue that Agamben does not 
provide sufficient evidence to support his sweeping equation of modernity with the 
camps, but it is hard to deny that his left-Schmittian argument poses probing 
questions about the much increased emphasis on state security and extralegal 
measures that has followed 9/11. His views converge with fears expressed by others 
on the anti-Bush left and even by some critics on the right; that the US may be in a 
transition to a garrison state or, paralleling ancient Rome, is at the “end of the 
republic.” However, Agamben’s vision of the camp as the essence of political 
modernity expresses a characteristic problem of extreme versions of the 
homogenization-regimentation thesis.(87) If historical resources for democracy are 
neutralized, must it be recreated de novo, and, if so, what insures against a 
simulated totalitarian version?  The estimation of liberal democracy is so low that it 
is hard to imagine the institutional complex that would come after the current one. 
Such analyses may contribute to the very erosion of legal rights and democracy that 
they criticize. Still Schmitt-Weber syntheses suggest a deepening legitimacy crisis of 
liberal democracy and, perhaps, even a postmodern evaporation of the very idea of 
democracy or blurring of its borders with autocracy that should be addressed. 
 
 
3. Conclusion: Weber in the US After Postwar Modernization 
 
3.1. Searching for Justice: Is the Normative Project of Modernization Reawakening? 
 
By the late 1980s, even left-leaning thinkers held that a “post-Marxist” era had 
dawned and that new social movements, failed communism, and triumphant 
neoliberalism had relegated Marx permanently to the “dustbin of history.” Thus, 
pundits were caught by surprise when Marx recently won a second straight BBC 
Radio 4 poll as history’s greatest philosopher. The survey aside, interest in Marx 
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has been growing for over a decade. (88) His return comes after the postwar era 
when memory of communist regimes and insurgencies is less vivid and 
contradictions of the dominant free-market ideology are felt increasingly in daily 
life. Marx’s writings offer analytical tools and research questions pertinent to the 
current historical moment. However, the revived interest in his thought likely is 
animated more by his normative arguments for just distribution of the material 
means for relieving unnecessary suffering and for activating individual rights and 
powers. In these neoliberal times, Marx is once again emblematic of a yearning for 
social justice. 
Achieving liberty and equality has been long a central issue in modernization 
debates, and, for liberal democrats, a normative project of the process. Balancing 
the two ideals always has been problematic and contested by right and left. In US 
history, liberty has usually held the upper hand. At certain historical moments, 
however, equality has been brought to the foreground by left-leaning social 
movements and reform politics. (89) The Neoliberal policy regime was posed 
against 1960s, Johnsonian ,“Great Society,” social legislation, and was aimed to 
reverse the long wave of “New Deal,” progressive-liberal, welfare-state social and 
labor policies. The neoliberal view that economic costs and negative social outcomes 
of regulation, redistribution, and other social programs outweigh their benefits has 
been ascendent for nearly three decades. Neoliberals hold that welfare dependence 
is the main cause of intergenerational poverty. In their view, liberty trumps equality. 
Neoliberal policymaking and consequent declining unions, falling wages and 
benefits, increasing job insecurity, eroding social safety-nets, and growing economic 
inequality and plutocracy manifest the socially disembedded capitalism Marx 
described. Hurricane Katrina suddenly made the grinding poverty of the poorest 
people in the richest country visible. Critics of neoliberalism argue that the 
normative project to secure social justice has been neutralized and that neoliberal 
globalization exports American-style Social Darwinism to the entire globe. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, post-Marxists attacked Marx’s limited view of civil 
society and Marxism’s one-sided emphasis on labor movements. However, their 
celebratory view of the triumph of cultural politics over class politics and new social 
movements over labor movements were shortsighted at a moment when neoliberal 
hegemony and economic inequality were rapidly on the rise. Today, 
antiglobalization politics link culture and class and revive a concern for labor 
issues.(90) Still sensitized to the importance of civil society and generally adverse to 
authoritarian centralism, left-leaning movements now operate under the flag of 
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“democracy” (Claus Offe 1996, pp. 260-61). Democratic aspirations animated the 
peaceful revolutions in the former communist regimes. Today, they oppose 
fundamentalist absolutism, sectarian terror, authoritarian security procedures, and 
cruelty (e.g,. children’s rights and animal rights). Democracy discourses suffuse 
campaigns for minority recognition (e.g., of women, gay and lesbian people, first 
peoples, ethnic/religious minorities), environmental justice, and economic justice. 
However, a vague, contested referent, “democracy” also has been deployed to 
justify neoliberal deregulation, pre-emptive war, torture, and terror. 
At the end of the postwar era, capitalist development and modernization continue in 
a more extensive, rapid, disjunctive fashion than ever before; local and regional 
variants multiply. Complexly entwined with these processes, the future of 
democracy is hard to envision in a neatly bounded alternative regime. However, the 
desire for substantive freedom, or real liberty and real equality, is as central as ever 
to aspirations for progress. Polestars of the past debates, Marx and Weber are 
themselves embedded in the modernization process and, thus, continue to be a 
lingua franca for engaging it. However, their deficits with regard to theorizing 
democracy preclude them from being the guide for this vital facet of the next phase 
of the big discourse.(91) Neopragmatists  hold that neoliberal individualism, 
postmodernist deconstruction, anti-liberal absolutism cannot come to terms with 
increased social inequality and eroded social integration from globalization, 
tribalism, and the post-9/11 climate. (92) They argue that John Dewey’s thought 
contains vital resources for rethinking democracy, absent in Marx’s and Weber’s’ 
views, and offers a deeper, wider vision of the cultural problem of democratization 
than other theories of the process. Dewey contended that the “human meaning of 
democracy” is the “realization of human equality and freedom” (Dewey 
[1934]1989c, p.103). His democratic vision resonates with today’s nascent 
sensibilities that link economic justice to cultural justice and that counter claims that 
liberty and equality cannot be meshed. 
Below I fuse Dewey’s ideas with themes from the progressive-liberal side of 
Weber’s thought. Antiliberals usually have seen Dewey to be a counterpoint to their 
positions and, thus, rejected his ideas more emphatically than they did Weber’s 
thought. Arguing that the problem of democracy cannot be resolved on an abstract 
level, Dewey aimed to draw attention to the depth of the crisis of democracy and 
articulate a starting point for thinking critically about alternatives to free-market 
liberalism and authoritarian centralism. The fusion below is posed in the same 
spirit, and counters to the already emergent Schmitt-Weber alternative. By contrast 
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to the other Weber fusions discussed above, the Dewey-Weber fusion is a product 
of theoretical imagination and speculation about the future, rather than an analysis 
of neo-Weberian trends.(93)  
 
 
3.2. The Communication Model Contra Schmitt: A Dewey-Weber Synthesis (94)  
  
In Weber’s lectures on economic history, delivered during his last year and framed 
in the context of the post-World War I economic crisis, he warned that capitalist 
society could now be held accountable by the “poorest laborer.” He argued that 
Smithean arguments about capitalism’s natural harmony of interest, which replaced 
the Protestant work ethic, were embraced mainly by writers who romanticized the 
free-market and by economic elites who it justified. He held that the working class 
lack religious consolation for their lowly material station and the misery they suffer 
in economic crises. Weber said that they see economic inequality through a this-
worldly lens, as a condition “that must be changed” (giving rise to the idea of 
“rational socialism”), (Weber [1927] 1981, pp. 291-92, 369). Although stressing 
the growing desire for economic justice, Weber did not believe that it could be 
achieved or, at least, not without great economic costs, much instrumental 
irrationality, and political repression. In his view, equality would trump liberty. 
Thus, he stressed, with regret, the triumph of efficiency over substantive freedom 
and liberty over equality. By contrast, Dewey implied that the tension Weber saw 
between formal rationality and substantive rationality could be resolved in ways that 
favor increased substantive freedom and equality. In the midst of the Great 
Depression, Dewey held that  free-market liberty masked unfreedom (e.g., Dewey 
[1934] 1989b; [1939] 1988e). He rejected the Lockean view of property as a 
natural right, arguing that it is a social compact that could and should be altered to 
avert sharp inequalities. Dewey embraced Jefferson’s view that relative economic 
equality is needed for intelligent citizenship and active political participation.(95) 
Most importantly, Dewey’s ideal of radical democracy stresses extending, as widely 
as possible, the distribution of the cultural and material means for achieving 
substantive cultural freedom and political freedom as well as economic justice. 
Following Jefferson, Dewey saw democracy as a “social idea” or a cultural project 
to create a just and participatory private life and civil society as well as responsive 
political institutions. For Dewey, democracy must be nurtured in local spaces (e.g., 
families, schools, workplaces) to cultivate the type of social selves capable of 
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democratic participation in national and global affairs. He held that Fascism’s, 
Nazism’s, and Stalinism’s garnering of working class support called for fundamental 
rethinking of democracy. In his view, liberal political institutions would not survive 
if they remained demagogic and merely formal. 
In the unstable aftermath of World War I, Weber warned about demagogs’ bloody 
absolute ethics and “psychic proletarianization” of the masses. By contrast, he 
advocated that leaders take responsibility for outcomes and, in that light, consider 
means as seriously as ends, evaluate soberly as possible consequences of their 
rhetoric and policy, and adjust their action accordingly. His ideas of “value 
neutrality” and “objectivity” call for similar realism and  prudence in scientific 
practices.(96) Weber denied vehemently charges that his views about separation of 
factual arguments and normative claims endorse relativism and that value freedom 
means ethical disengagement. His “objectivity” essay portrayed science’s 
perspectival, value-rooted nature and fluid borders between fact and value (Weber 
[1904] 1949c, pp. 80-82, 94, 107-12). Conversely to sterile scientism, his position 
on values and science manifested, at least, in part, his Nietzschean sensibilities 
about living “without illusions”and facing obdurate realities. (97) He thought that 
inquiry about factual matters clarifies questions of value and identifies 
“inconvenient facts,” which, when engaged honestly, generate critical reflexivity 
about normative aims. He believed that highly differentiated cultural spheres, each 
rationalized according to its own internal logic, and culturally diverse citizenry 
preclude ethical consensus in the public sphere. Weber embraced pluralism, 
however, seeing liberal diversity and value conflict to provide cultural space for 
autonomous individuality or critical deliberation about one’s life-course and socio-
political participation. And he equated absolutist belief with “intellectual sacrifice” 
or a suspension of critical faculties. Rather than leveling values, Weber held that 
“scientific” or “objective” standpoints provide means to inform difficult normative 
choices and are essential to the “trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of 
life” that he declared to be “decisive” in politics. (98) He stressed science’s ethical 
meaning as much as its instrumental powers. Weber was aware that science serves 
diverse and sometimes destructive ends, but he still saw it as a vital post-traditional, 
cultural resource that can provide tools for living, illuminate and moderate political 
actions, and counter absolutist illiberality. (99) 
Paralleling Weber, Dewey held that socio-cultural differentiation forbids a return to 
traditional authority, except in simulated, authoritarian form. Like Weber, he spoke 
primarily about the public sphere and civil society. Both theorists acknowledged 
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that traditional authority is not extinguished in modernity and that it may thrive in 
domains of private and associational life. Neither theorist treated rationalization and 
disenchantment as a total leveling process. Dewey saw plural values and value 
conflicts to generate splits and tensions, but he also held that they can nurture 
ethical reflexivity and enhanced ability to engage difference (Dewey and Tufts 
[1932] 1985, pp.162-310). He argued that absolutist normative beliefs preclude 
deliberation and justify elitism and autocracy. Cold-War era, anti-liberal attacks on 
his alleged naive optimism and scientism paid little attention to his texts. Dewey 
declared bankrupt the Enlightenment equation of technical progress with social and 
political progress, and warned emphatically about democratic institutions’ fragility, 
authoritarian threats, media propaganda, and failed political vision at home and 
abroad (Dewey [1939] 1988e, p. 156. See Dewey [1935] 1987; [1927] 1988b; 
[1929] 1988c; [1929] 1988d; [1939] 1988e; [1939] 1988f ). He railed against 
science’s service to war machines and corporate advertisers, but he held that it is 
still needed to make complex policy judgments more intelligent and responsible. 
Engaging Lippmann’s critique of popular sovereignty, he acknowledged the 
suffusion of expert knowledge and information and rampant media manipulation, 
but he denied that active citizenship required “omnicompetence.” He held that 
technical modernity’s expertise and related complexities call forth the need to 
cultivate critical capacities and intelligent citizenry. (100) Like Weber, Dewey 
embraced a post-Enlightenment conception of science; its knowledge is uncertain, 
incomplete, and temporal and thus, is necessarily open to dialogue, contestation, 
and revision. Both theorists saw consequential knowledge and awareness of 
science’s limits to be essential facets of a post-traditional ethic of responsibility. By 
contrast to automatic obedience to tradition or authority, they held that post-
Enlightenment science’s uncertainty, discursively-mediated nature, and ideal of 
open, honest, systematic, uncoerced inquiry has “integrity”in culturally-diverse, 
post-traditional settings and provides a fundamental resource for liberal-democratic 
culture and deliberative democracy. From their vantage points, democracy and 
science are imperfect, convergent historical projects. That these ideals are not often 
realized in practice, they held, is all the more reason for affirming them.  
However, Dewey saw value conflict to be less pervasive, intense, and intractable 
than Weber, and had much higher hopes about creation of collective 
understandings and substantive democracy. Weber did not theorize the social 
psychological processes by which people reach normative understandings or forge 
social integration and, thus, in regard to ultimate values, he does not escape the 
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“philosophy of the subject.” By contrast, the Dewey-Mead communication model 
focuses on just these issues. (101) This approach contends that  reflexive social 
integration is rooted in people “taking the attitude of the other” (i.e., “sympathetic 
placing of themselves in each others roles”), rather than in simple adherence to 
shared norms or values per se (Mead  [1934] 1964 passim; [1922] 1963c , p. 
246). Dewey and Mead held that individuals reach understandings and cooperate 
by imagining themselves in the place of the other emotionally as well as 
instrumentally, meshing their action accordingly, and modifying it through 
reciprocal communicative acts. They considered this process to be a matrix from 
which values and norms originate.(102) They did not equate value judgment and 
normatively-guided action with application of a norm per se. In their view, values 
and norms employed reflexively are not commands that orchestrate action, but are 
cultural means to orient to divergent social situations and share attitudes with 
diverse others. Rather than mechanical compliance to norms, Dewey and Mead 
held that reflexive ethical decisions depend on engaging specific conditions of 
particular situations and choosing and interpreting norms accordingly. By contrast, 
they considered fundamentalist adherence to norms and rigid application of them to 
be ethically irresponsible. Finally, their communication model does not presume 
that social integration requires consensus or shared identity. For example, taking 
the attitude of others with divergent sexual orientations or ethnicity can forge 
understandings that resolve conflicts, express respect, and build friendships, while 
they increase awareness of difference. According to Dewey and Mead, one does not 
have to embrace the sexual activities, food traditions, or religious beliefs of the 
other to understand, respect, or cooperate with her or him. They embraced a 
pluralistic or multicultural vision of democracy in which different ways of life coexist 
and thrive. Creating and reproducing this type of order, they held, requires effective 
attitude-sharing, or communication.  
Dewey and Mead were cognizant, however, that social conflict is sometimes 
extremely destructive, mean spirited, and enduring and, thus, is often the source of 
one-sided, hostile, or even hateful attitude-sharing, which undermines 
communicative mediation. Moreover, they acknowledged that even effective, 
fairminded communication cannot resolve all problems and that habit, reification, 
and coercion will likely endure in cultural reproduction. However, against 
conservative anti-liberals, they contended that friend-enemy dynamics do not inhere 
in difference per se. In their view, presupposing that peoples sharing sharply 
divergent cultures have inherent animosity toward the other and that all bitter 
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conflicts between them are immune to discursive mediation erects a massive self-
fulfilling, culturally-constructed barrier to communication and peaceful, cooperative 
coexistence. It also denies the empirical reality of the historical settings where 
diverse cultures have coexisted peacefully. Mead and Dewey held that 
communicative capacities make possible extension of deliberative democratic 
processes in local settings, wider voluntary associations, and corporate and public 
institutions. They also argued that even apparently intractable civilizational barriers 
are sometimes bridged by communication. They saw modern socio-cultural 
differentiation and ever wider extension of  technical and social means of 
interchange to multiply differences, erode normative justifications based purely on 
tradition or authority, and make possible much wider attitude-sharing capacities. 
Yet they stressed emphatically that attainment of such powers and peaceful 
cooperation is not automatic and must be cultivated consciously against myriad 
forms of cultural manipulation, distortion, and conflict. In this light, they would 
have viewed today’s globalization, with all its contradictory features, to be both a 
major problem and great opportunity for building communicative capacities.     
Against absolutism, Dewey held that shutting down deliberation about norms and 
values formalizes them, undermining their “spirit” and legitimacy, depleting 
resources for attitude-sharing, and opening the way for friend-enemy politics. (103)  
From this perspective, absolutist normative claims are a subterfuge for top-down 
control favoring authoritarianism, rather than being a prophylactic against it. Dewey 
held that natural rights theory is a fiction erected originally to support individual 
autonomy against the tyranny of traditionalist compulsory association and the early-
modern absolutist state. He held that laissez-faire individualism had the same root. 
However, he contended that, today, the two theories justify respectively autocratic 
state power and unchecked corporate power. Dewey decried demagogic exploitation 
of friend-enemy dichotomies, which mask an escape from responsibility and favor 
authoritarianism (1988e, pp. 88-89). By contrast to Schmittean contentions about 
the incommensurability of culture, futility of dialogue, and need for national 
homogeneity, Dewey held that a society rich in difference has a larger cultural 
toolbox of resources for sharing attitudes and, thus, for living, coping with 
problems, and creating new culture. He thought that promoting openness and even 
receptivity to difference can forge multicultural social integration. The fragmentation 
decried by antiliberals, he argued, derives not from diversity per se, but primarily 
from the failure to achieve substantive equal opportunity and extend substantive 
liberty widely enough. Building on Jefferson, Dewey held that the fate of democratic 
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political and legal institutions depend on building a democratic culture that provides 
individuals cultural acceptance and economic and social means for participation. 
(104) He argued that the lack of cultural freedom weakens the vitality of political 
democracy and paves the way for autocracy. In his view, democratization of local 
social relations and civil society - the space where people lead their daily lives - is 
essential to substantive democratization and active citizenship. Dewey and Mead 
stressed the importance of voluntary association; they saw its patterns to be a 
formative force in constituting the self and linking the individual and society and 
citizen and state. (105) This theme builds on ideas that go back to Jefferson and 
Tocqueville, were stressed by Durkheim (“professional” or “intermediate”groups), 
later became a central focus of American sociology (studies of “secondary groups” 
or “voluntary associations”), and are still central to current debates over the state of 
American democracy. (106) 
Dewey and Weber diverged on many points. Referring to democratic citizenry, they 
employed the same metaphor; that “one does not have to be a shoemaker to know if 
the shoe fits” (Weber [1921] 1968, pp. 1456-7; Dewey [1927] 1968, p. 364-65). 
Weber applied the phrase to qualify his warnings about abuses of plebiscitary 
politics, while Dewey used it to call on theorists to engage “the problem of the 
public”- to improve or democratize “the methods and conditions of debate, 
discussion, and persuasion” and fashion a more participatory, inclusive democracy. 
Weber expressed grave doubts about the prospects for establishment of sufficient 
agreement and mediation of conflictive interests to advance social justice, but, like 
Dewey, he embraced liberal democracy and warned that it would be in peril if such 
progress is not achieved. A Dewey-Weber fusion would address this unresolved 
tension in Weber’s thought. Weber’s work has more sociological depth than 
Dewey’s corpus, offering better tools to detect structural and institutional blockages 
to democratization and distinguish plausible possibilities for stronger 
democratization from wistful hopes about it. However, Dewey saw democracy as a 
work in progress with no endpoint, dependent on variable cultural conditions and 
historical contingencies. He implied that the democratization process needs to be 
informed by the types of tough-minded cultural science and policy analysis that 
Weber called for. In Dewey’s view, treating democracy as a utopian endpoint sets 
an impossible standard that denies democratic ideals incremental advancement and 
that creates fertile conditions for claims about exhaustion and autocratic solutions. 
Dewey and Weber embraced convergent historicist views, which antiliberal, natural 
rights theorists and pessimistic critical theorists assert pave the way for nihilism, 
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fascism, and communism.  From a Dewey-Weber standpoint, antiliberal critics’ 
absolutist, formalist, and decisionist “alternatives” cultivate the very problems that 
they attribute to historicism and their homogenization-regimentation theses reflect 
distorted political vision, rooted in their “quest for certainty,” rather than actual 
exhaustion of the historical process. 
 
 
4. Postscript: Rupture, Theory, and Reconstruction 
 
It will not be long before new peoples shall arise and new springs rush down into the 
depths... The earthquake reveals new springs. Nietzsche (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) 
Dewey feared that liberal democracy was too thinly institutionalized, or not yet 
embedded deeply enough in people’s beliefs and habits, to withstand the global 
economic crisis and grave authoritarian threats of the 1930s. He warned that liberal 
institutions were unsustainable if they were reduced to formal legal rights, 
occasional votes, and consumer freedom for those who could afford it. Liberal 
democracy’s survival, he held, depends on forging a “fighting liberalism” that 
embraces and extends substantive freedom (Dewey [1927]1988b; [1929] 1988d; 
[1935] 1987; [1939] 1988e). He saw the project of democratization to be a matter 
of practical politics and active agency. But he held that such efforts must be 
“intelligent” and, therefore, include a theoretical moment. He stressed especially 
the need to engage and debunk self-fulfilling ideological assumptions and claims, 
which block cultural and political vision or the ability to formulate democratic 
alternatives and to steel the will to pursue them against tough opposition. Dewey 
believed that the deep crises of his time made people receptive to new political 
visions. He advocated a fundamental rethinking of democracy, or what he saw as an 
effort to recover and reconstruct the suppressed “spiritual”side of the American 
tradition. (107) 
We likely live on the verge of a moment of rupture. The return of Schmitt and 
antiliberal politics already suggest the start of a seismic shift in cultural and political 
vision. Today, the range of new cultural and political alternatives is not yet clear in 
the postwar era’s fading twilight, but its sharper outline may be a crisis away. Dark 
possibilities already loom on the American horizon in the wake of several decades 
of neoliberal policy, the Iraq War and War on Terror, and Hurricane Katrina’s 
human and material wreckage. Dewey’s type of radical democratic sensibilities are 
embedded in US political culture and have erupted, in times past, into social 
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movements and policy regimes, which have made American democracy more 
inclusive (Dewey 1988e and Foner 1998). While interest in Dewey has grown, it is 
an open question whether his vision will return to US politics. A key facet of his 
thought has strong affinity for views manifested in the aforementioned “return of 
Marx” and other signs of a revived search for justice. In the shadow of the Great 
Depression and Nazi and Fascist threat, Dewey attacked the Liberty League’s 
reduction of democracy to capitalism and liberty to free-markets and property 
rights, He declared: 
Let radicals make clear that an infinitely greater amount of real liberty is possible 
than our present system provides for. Let them make clear that they are the ones 
who would extend the liberties that our forefathers fought till they include all 
members of society and until every normal human being has the opportunity to 
develop to the full, in peace and security, the capacities with which [she and] he is 
naturally endowed. Regiment things and free human beings. Regiment machines 
and money and other inanimate things, and give liberty to human beings (Dewey 
[1934] 1989b, p 90). 
This ideal of substantive equal opportunity has deep historical roots and lives in 
American self-identity; most middle-class Americans like to think that it has already 
been realized. We want to believe that our culture is just and that personal success 
and status are earned through our own individual efforts in fair competition (108). 
However, this cherished ideal has long been in conflict with the society’s chief 
ideological and lived forms of liberty and consequent inequalities. Equality remains 
an unfulfilled project of American modernization. Will its time ever come? 
Concluding the “objectivity” essay, Weber held that in an “age of specialization” 
social researchers would focus on routine work and be oblivious to its “rootedness” 
in “ultimate value ideas.” He said that the “analysis of the data” would become an 
“end in itself.” “But,” he added: there comes a moment when the atmosphere 
changes. The significance of the unreflectively utilized viewpoints becomes 
uncertain and the road is lost in the twilight. The light of the great cultural problems 
moves on. Then science too prepares to change its standpoint and its analytical 
apparatus and to view the streams of events from the heights of thought”(Weber 
[1904] 1949, p. 112). Weber implied that sweeping social change makes 
problematic the normative and analytical presuppositions of taken for granted 
routine in science and the broader culture. He was likely pondering the motivation 
of his own query into “objectivity.” His generation reformulated social thought in 
response to the sudden rise of mechanized, urban, secular capitalism and, later, to 
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World War I, when modernization when awry. Dewey, Mills, Gouldner, and others 
have since held that “social theorists” should reflect on the directions of science and 
society in stable times as well as in moments of rupture. The various Weber fusions, 
discussed above, engaged modernization theory - arguably the postwar era’s 
primary metanarrative for legitimating and challenging liberal democracy. Multiple 
waves of homogenization-regimentation theses express  uncertainties inhering in 
modernization theorists’ hopes and fears about progress. Long-term concerns aside, 
however, global economic, geopolitical, and cultural changes and catastrophic 
threats or risks (e.g., global warming, resource depletion, and terror) have ended 
the postwar conjuncture and might call forth the type of fundamental critical 
reflection of which Weber spoke and, perhaps, a day of reckoning that will 
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(1) Thanks to Ira Cohen, Steve Kalberg, Bob Kent, Hal Orbach, Larry Scaff, 
Sandro Segre, and David Smith for their critical readings and good suggestions. 
Thanks to Pasquale Carraciolo for instruction on things Nietzschean. While their 
criticism helped the essay, it would have been stronger had I been able to carry out 
all their suggestions. Any mistakes are mine. 
(2) This essay focuses on Weber in the postwar US, but national borders and 
intellectual boundaries are fluid. Shifts in Weber interpretation, originating in non-
English speaking parts of the world, often reach the US, where they are interpreted 
through an American lens. Also, some of the shifts discussed below originated from 
other English speaking countries, especially the United Kingdom. Emphasis will be 
on their meaning in the American context. Occasionally, “North American” is used 
to remind readers that these trends often spread across the continent. 
(3) Sica (2004a, pp. 75-104) covers parallel ground in a somewhat different 
manner. See Kalberg 1996 and Swedberg 2003 for other periodizations of Weber 
interpretation; see Scaff 2004 on Weber’s impact on US social science, and Breiner 
2004 on Weber translations. Stephen Turner’s 2000a edited volume provides a 
good example of recent work by Weber specialists, and Sven Eliaeson 2002: pp. 
97-117 offers a brief account of recent “‘state of the art’ Weberology.” 
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(4) Since the initial publication, Parsons’ translation of  The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism has been standard, assigned reading in many sociological theory 
classes. The accuracy of the translation has been contested (e.g., see Scaff 2005a; 
Kalberg 2001a), but it is still in print, with an introduction by Anthony Giddens 
(Weber 2001). Two new translations, based on different versions of the German 
original, have been published (Weber 2002a and 2002b). On the relevance of the 
work and long debate over it, see Lehmann and Roth 1995 
(5) R.H. Tawney’s ([1926] 1954) critical commentary about Weber’s Protestant 
ethic thesis was one of the earliest English-language treatments of his ideas. In 
1927, Economist Frank Knight’s translation of Weber’s (1981) economic history 
lectures appeared. Pitirim Sorokin (1928, pp. 673-96) and Theodore Abel (1929, 
pp. 116-59) provided early, brief accounts of Weber’s ideas in their theory books. 
Parsons ( [1923-1937] 1991) mentioned Weber in many of his early writings, but 
his translation of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ([1904-05] 1930) 
and extensive analysis of Weber’s thought in The Structure of Social Action ([1937] 
1968) had widest impact. After the war, Parsons (1947) published a long 
introductory essay to his edited volume of selections from Weber’s Economy and 
Society. The next year Parsons (1948) published another essay on Weber’s views of 
capitalism and modern institutions. In the early postwar era, Weber’s work on the 
world religions, the city, and methodology were also translated in to English ([1921] 
1947; 1949a: [1920] 1951; [1917-1919] 1952; [1921] 1958a; [1921] 
1958b;1963). Postwar sociological theory texts included substantial sections on 
Weber (e.g., Timasheff 1955, pp. 167-83; Martindale 1960, pp. 376-93). 
Reinhard Bendix (1960) wrote the first English-language treatise on Weber’s overall 
corpus. Until publication of this study, Guenther Roth (1977) argued, English 
speakers lacked the comprehensive overview of Weber’s work needed to see his 
portrayal of the Protestant ethic in the wider context of his comparative studies of 
religion and his conception of bureaucracy in relation to his related typologies of 
domination structures. Roth held that Bendix’s work demonstrated the limitations of 
Parsons’ Weber and helped stimulate the rise of a Weberian comparative-historical 
sociology that countered structural-functionalism. Yet even Roth conceded that 
Parsons exerted the widest influence on the early postwar, American vision of 
Weber (Roth and Wittich 1968, p. xxvi). Special sections in the American 
Sociological Review on Parsons’ thought (June 1964, vol 29) and in honor of the 
hundredth anniversary of Weber’s birth (April 1965, vol. 30) provide insight into 
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the postwar view of Weber. See Parsons 1980, on his encounter with Weber’s 
thought. 
(6) See e.g., Parsons 1951, p. 368. Parsons (e.g., 1971, p. 7) expressed his debt 
to Weber in quasi-Durkheimian arguments about “pattern maintenance” and 
normative integration. Parsons argued that Weber started out as a materialist, 
convergent with Marx, But after Weber’s nervous breakdown and at the start of his 
work on ascetic Protestantism, Parsons held, he forged an “anti-Marxian 
interpretation” of modern capitalism. Parsons claimed that Weber’s methodological 
shift to explaining capitalism by its “system of values and value attitudes,” was “a 
direct polemical challenge to the Marxian type of explanation” ([1937] 1968 pp. 
503, 510). He held that Weber’s mature work and bulk of his corpus was inspired 
by this “Parsonsian” turn. 
(7) See Reinhard Bendix’s (1960, pp. 481-82) translation of Weber’s concept of 
Herrschaft as domination and Parsons’ (1960a, p. 752) critique. On translating 
Weber, see Roth 1992. 
(8) Parsons held that postwar US leaders deployed power to serve system 
integration and its functional operation, rather than to exert “power over” others. 
Although overstating coercion in modern organizations, Parsons held, Weber 
recognized the fundamental role of technical competence and professional expertise 
and, thus, anticipated the ascendency of collegial decision-making over top-down 
operations. See Parsons 1947, pp 58-60, note 4; 1947, pp. 131, note 59,152, 
note 83; 1960b, pp. 41-44, 182, 219-21; 1971, 116-21. See Cohen, Hazelrigg, 
and Pope, on “De-Parsonizing Weber.” In these organizations, Parsons held, 
professionals were the hardest workers and the working class was the “leisure 
class.” See Parsons 1971, pp. 105-6, 112, 133; Antonio 1984. 
(9) Favorable references to Weber are scattered throughout Parsons (1951) postwar 
tome,  The Social System, which is the most comprehensive statement of his 
structural-functionalism. Parsons (1964) also claimed that  his later “evolutionary 
universals” argument was inspired by Weber. Parsons was aware of Weber’s 
scathing criticism of theories of evolutionary progress. However, Parsons held that 
Weber leaned toward a systemic or organicist theory of society even though he 
objected strenuously to this view on methodological grounds (Parsons 1947, pp. 18-
25). Parsons argued that his own evolutionary views were consistent with the 
“spirit” of Weber’s work; i.e., following in the tracks of his alleged belief in the 
“universal significance” of Western civilization and “general pattern of human 
social evolution” (Parsons 1971, pp. 2-3, 139). 
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(10) See Godfrey Hodgson’s (1978, pp. 67-98) succinct yet comprehensive 
portrayal of the of “the ideology of liberal consensus” and its key proponents. 
(11) See Mills [1943] 2000a, p 53. He was referring to a section from Weber’s 
Economy and Society ([1921] 1968) on Class and Status-Groups. Gerth’s and Mills’ 
translation appeared first in the journal Politics ([1921] 1944) and later in their 
collection (Weber 1946a, pp. 180-95). 
(12) Compare Gerth’s and Mills’ (1946, pp. 61-65) argument about the role of 
ideas and interests in Weber’s thought with Parsons’ autonomous view of culture 
(e.g., 1971, pp. 1-28)  
(13) Gerth’s and Mills’ interpretation was a more accurate rendering of Weber than 
Parsons’ views, but it also a selective or one-sided view and was not free of 
translation problems. By the 1950s other English-language works offered different 
alternatives to the Parsons’ Weber (e.g., see Hughes [1958] 1977, passim). On 
translation problems, see Roth 1992. 
(14) Mills was critical of the US and USSR. See especially, his The Causes of World 
War Three (1958), where he discussed the rise of the “permanent war 
economy,”and Listen Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba (1960). 
(15) In a Guggenheim Fellowship application, Mills (2000b, p. 79) portrayed his 
intellectual roots: “In sociology my main impulse has been taken from German 
developments, especially the traditions stemming from Max Weber and, to a lesser 
degree, Karl Mannheim.” Mills’ analytical separation of political power and class 
converged with Weberian sociology, but, in a critical exchange, he explained his 
admiration for Marx: “I happen never to have been what is called ‘a Marxist,’ but I 
believe Karl Marx one of the most astute students of society modern civilization has 
ever produced; his work is now essential equipment of any adequately trained social 
scientist as well as any properly educated person. Those who say they hear Marxian 
echoes in my work are saying that I have trained myself well. That they do not 
intend this testifies to their own lack of proper education” (Mills [1957] 2000c, p. 
237)  See e.g., Mills 1951; 1956; 1958; 1963; and Gerth and Mills 1953. On 
Mills and Weber, see Tillman 1984, pp. 42-50; Aronowitz 2003. 
(16) Weber’s so-called “despairing liberalism” is often associated with Nietzschean 
facets of his work. Poignant references to Nietzsche are scattered in his corpus. He 
is supposed to have said that the “honesty of a contemporary scholar” can be 
judged by his or her “stand in relation to Nietzsche and Marx.”(Scaff 1989, p. 6). 
On Nietzsche and Weber, see e.g., Eden 1982; 1983; 1987; Schroeder 1987; 
Warren 1988; Hennis 1988; Mommsen 1989; Scaff 1989; Treiber, 1995. 
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(17) Quoted in Marianne Weber [1926] 1975, p. 293. Lawrence Scaff (2005b, p. 
64) explains that the meaning of the quote is blurred a bit by lines that she omitted. 
He holds that Max Weber’s point was more subtle and qualified than the 
antimodern or anticapitalist tone of this fragment. However, homogenization-
regimentation theorists also tend to see Weber’s comments about the leveling force 
of instrumental rationalization in isolation from other facets of his work or to ignore 
qualifications, which moderate or condition his views about the process. See 
Kalberg 1980; 2001b; 2005, for a balanced view of the complexities of Weber’s 
theory of rationalization and bureaucratization and his related conception of “iron 
cage.”. 
(18) According to Weber, “monocratic” or “fully developed” bureaucracy is 
modern capitalism’s dominant, formal organizational type. He stressed its machine-
like character, dehumanized activity,  calculative emphasis,  narrow specialization, 
and top-down domination. In his view, the single head fixes ultimate responsibility 
at the top, and makes possible quick, unambiguous, decisive moves with regard to 
important matters and crises ([1921] 1946d). Weber saw science to be a legitimate, 
major arbiter of modern public culture, but he also held that it contributes to 
“devastating senselessness”- it cannot answer fundamental normative questions 
about the direction of individual life or social policy or “Which of the warring gods 
shall we serve.”See Weber [1919] 1946b; [1919], 1946c; [1915] 1946f, pp. 350-
57. 
(19) The homogenization-regimentation thesis has been expressed by diverse 
thinkers, including liberals. For example, compare the accounts of American “mass 
society” by Weber-influenced Daniel Bell, a culturally-conservative liberal  ([1960] 
1988, pp. 21-38) and by anti-liberal Weber critic Leo Strauss’ ([1968] 1995, pp. 
260-72). For criticism of one-sided views of Weber, including the anti-liberal 
versions, see e.g., Roth 1965; 1975; Weiss 1987. 
(20) Not all facets of “anti-liberal” theorists’ social thought and political views are 
anti-liberal. Different theorists stress the exhaustion of liberalism in varying degrees, 
and their theories and overall corpora often combine anti-liberal with liberal 
elements. 
(21) Gunnell (1988, p. 73) held that these anti-liberal critics (e.g., Leo Strauss, Eric 
Voegelin, Hans Morganthau, Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, Franz Neumann, 
Arnold Brecht, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse) posed “the thesis that 
liberalism, either inherently or because of its degenerate condition, was at the core 
of a modern crisis and implicated in the rise of totalitarianism.” See also Gunnell 
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1993. Recall, however, my qualification that not all facets these thinkers’ thought 
and political views were anti-liberal. My focus is on the homogenization-
regimentation thesis, which the theorists employed in varying degrees. 
(22) Earlier German speaking thinkers also contributed substantially to anti-liberal 
currents. For example, Nietzsche had an enormous, multisided impact on them, and 
Simmel’s arguments about the leveling and relativizing force of money and 
consequent growing “tragedy of culture” influenced  younger scholars (e.g., 
Lukács). Weimar era thinkers, such as Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, and  Martin 
Heidegger, contributed directly and substantially to anti-liberal views. 
(23) Bloom’s view of Weber was likely influenced heavily by his antiliberal, émigré 
mentor Leo Strauss’s critique. See Bloom 1987,  pp. 147-51 and  Horkheimer 
[1947] 1974, p. 81. 
(24) Some of these thinkers saw Weber-influenced Karl Mannheim’s views about 
ideology, scientific politics and planning and, especially, his relativistic sociology of 
knowledge to be an influential carrier of these Weberian themes (e.g., Adorno 
1981, pp, 37-49). See Mannheim [1936] 1955. Mannheim’s optimistic views about 
postwar reconstruction paralleled those of Dewey, but tended to be more socially 
conservative. See Mannheim 1950, especially footnotes on pp. 52, 206, 222; 
Gunnell 1982, pp. 395-96. See Baehr 2002, for commentary on Hannah Arendt’s 
critical analysis of relativistic sociology and totalitarianism, and Parvikko 2004, for 
discussion of Max Weber’s impact on her thought. 
(25) Strauss ([1950] 1965, p.48) criticized Weber’s “noble nihilism,”or allegedly 
misguided belief that “intellectual honesty” and preference for “human freedom” 
dictate acknowledgment of the “baseless character” of noble ideals or “objective 
norms” (i.e., absolute truths). 
(26) Strauss’s and Voegelin’s approaches have some affinity for Thomist 
philosophy, which admonishes ethical individualism and calls for strict adherence to 
Catholic dogma. Thomists usually do not embrace Strauss and Voegelin, but they 
see them as allies in the fight against relativism and share their critical view of 
Weber as a leveler of values. See e.g., Midgley 1983. On Strauss’ and Voegelin’s 
reading of Weber, see Gunnell 2004. See McDaniel 1998, for analysis of Strauss’ 
view of inequality and an argument that he stops short of anti-liberalism. Like 
Weber, Strauss argued that modern secular people try to “escape into the self and 
art.” However, Strauss held that such flight is a denial or flight from true values and 
from legitimate moral authority. He declared that “the self... does not defer to 
anything higher”and its autonomy today is a source confusion and 
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despair”(Strauss1968, p. 261). 
(27) Nietzsche also had a relatively independent influence on Strauss and Voegelin. 
They criticized Nietzsche as the master philosopher of nihilism, but they lauded his 
recognition of it as a profound crisis of modernity and converged with his view that 
philosophical leadership was needed to fashion a new civilization. Voegelin’s 
Platonist quasi-Catholic thrust otherwise departed Nietzsche. By contrast, strong 
Nietzschean taints are manifested in Strauss’ points about “exoteric writing” (or 
“writing in between the lines”) and the “noble lie,” which imply that his embrace of 
objective value was strategic; aimed at empowering the “wise” or a philosophic elite 
capable of grasping the dangers of liberalism, cultivating belief and obedience 
among the “vulgar,” and, thus, securing and perpetuating western culture’s highest 
values. However, Strauss’ hoped-for disciplinary regime contradicted Nietzsche’s 
vision of a post-traditional, aesthetic-centered culture. See Strauss [1952] 1988, pp. 
22-37; Gunnell 1978. Strauss spoke of Nietzsche and Marx, exemplar figures of 
modernity’s “third wave,” as the culmination of its nihilistic tendencies and root of 
fascism and communism. Strauss held that the triumph of Marxist egalitarianism 
would produce a future characterized by the well-fed, comfortable, Nietzschean 
“last-man” - “the lowest and most decayed man, the herd man without any ideals or 
aspirations...” A defense of the superiority of liberal democracy, Strauss held, 
requires support from “the premodern thought of our western tradition.” See e.g., 
Strauss 1989a, pp. 97; [1968] 1995, pp. 270-72; 1989b, pp. 3-26; Voegelin 
[1952] 1966, pp. 162-89. 
(28) See Marcuse 1968, pp. 201-26; 1964. 
(29) On the Frankfurt School’s fusion of Nietzschean and Weberian themes, see 
e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno [1944] 1972; Marcuse [1955] 1966; Kellner 1985. 
Critical theorists believed that these normative resources could be derived by 
analyzing capitalism’s structural contradictions, its unfulfilled, universal ideological 
claims (e.g., about freedom, equality, justice, and plenty), and possible, nascent, or 
existent social movements that seek to realize such claims. See Benhabib 1986; 
Antonio 1981.  
(30) For example, Marcuse ([1955] 1966) made a Nietzschean-Weberian aesthetic 
turn to the body and sexuality. Favoring utopian vision, he countered his pessimism 
and encouraged left radicalism. He had a formative influence on 1960s and 1970s 
alternative culture and antiwar politics (i.e., thinkers who proposed new political 
alliances between alienated youth, people of color, and the Third World poor). 
However, Nietzsche-Weber fusions and their homogenization-regimentation theses 
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had divergent liberal directions as well. For example, second-generation Frankfurt 
theorist, Jürgen Habermas stressed cultural exhaustion; he stated: “bourgeois ideals 
have gone into retirement, there are no norms and values to which an immanent 
critique might appeal [with the expectation of] agreement. On the other hand, the 
melodies of ethical socialism have been played through without result” (1979, p. 
97). However, his doubts about historicism did not cause him to embrace purely 
negative criticism or abandon liberalism. Rather, he framed a quasitranscendental 
or nonhistorical “communicative ethics,” which he employed to defend aggressively 
liberal democracy. The pessimistic threads in his thought were countered by his 
engagement with liberals, such as Mead, Parsons, and Durkheim. 
(31) For example, Eric Fromm did not stress the homogenization-regimentation 
thesis nearly as strongly as Horkheimer and Adorno. Also, Horkheimer and Adorno 
contributed to the Frankfurt School studies on authority, anti-Semitism, and 
authoritarianism, which had a liberal-democratic thrust and were criticized later for 
their “liberal bias.” Frankfurt School theorists were repulsed by many important 
features of existent liberal democracies, but they did not reject its institutions in 
principle or in toto. By contrast to Strauss and Voegelin, they did not take anti-
modern stances, which broke with the modern ideals of liberty, equality, and 
democracy. Most of them remained left-leaning, modern social theorists. 
(32) Schmitt exerted substantial influence on Strauss and on various other major 
postwar thinkers (e.g., Hans Morgenthau and Samuel Huntington). See McCormick 
1998. Schmitt’s Nietzsche-Weber fusion and “friend-enemy” dichotomy, which will 
discussed below, provided a theoretical basis for convergent anti-communism and 
anti-liberalism. 
(33) Compare Löwith’s [1933] 1986, pp. 16-19, 27-61 portrayal of the two men 
with that of Strauss’s 1989b, pp. 27-46. 
(34) Strauss’ (1989b, pp. 41-46) discussion of  Heidegger’s fears about the 
possible rise of US- and Russian-led global technocracy, or “night of the world,” 
offers insight into the extreme Heideggerian regimentation-homogenization thesis. 
Strauss said that he was first impressed with Weber. However, after engaging 
Heidegger, he declared, “Weber appeared to me as an ‘orphan child’ in regard to 
precision and probing and competence” (Strauss 1988, pp. 27-8). Strauss drew 
inspiration from Heidegger, but Weberian threads are still evident in Straussian 
thought. 
(35) See Gouldner 1970, pp. vii. The antiwar movement, campus revolts, 
counterculture, assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, street 
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protests and police violence at the Chicago Democratic Convention, and New-Left 
revolutionary rhetoric neutralized what remained of the early postwar, liberal 
consensus. Centrist and right-wing politicians spoke of a breakdown of “law and 
order,” and left-liberal sociologists stressed major structural crises and fundamental 
social and political shifts (e.g., Perrucci and Pilisuk 1968; Skolnick and Currie 
1970). Divisions over race, the Vietnam War, and counterculture animated 
generational and ideological splits in US sociology. Sociologists pitted scientific 
sociology against politically engaged sociology. They also began to envision a 
multiperspectival or multiparadigm discipline; a Weber-influenced view that 
different theories have divergent normative content and distinctive lenses, which 
illuminate different facets of a pluralistic, conflictive social order. See Ritzer 1975. 
(36) Giddens’ contended that Marx, Durkheim, and Weber engaged incisively 
capitalist modernity, framing issues and formulating concepts that are still relevant 
for today’s capitalism. In the 1970s, many theorists argued that the work of these 
three classical theorists illuminate the roots of contemporary theoretical splits and 
the historical contexts that generated them. This alleged “holy trinity” became the 
core theoretical canon of 1970s American sociological theory. Even introductory 
textbooks often began with brief portraits of them, holding that their ideas were a 
major source of contemporary paradigmatic and ideological splits. 
(37) By the early-1950s, mainstream, American sociologists had rejected the idea 
of using  the classics to analyze contemporary society and, especially, of treating 
them as a model for creation of new theory. The dominant view was that the classics 
are a good source of  hypotheses and ideas, but that the style of work (i.e., 
“armchair” speculation) is passé and its decline as a practice marks sociology’s 
scientific progress. “Scientific” theorists wanted broader theories to be “objective” 
or be based strictly on empirical “middle-range” theories and related sociological 
research. See Merton 1957, pp. 3-16, 85-117. For an opposing view that inspired 
the critics, see Mills 1961, pp. 143-76. During the 1970s classical theory revival, 
however, the majority and, perhaps, even the vast majority of American sociologists 
(e.g., specialized researchers and scientific theorists) still saw classical theory to be 
moribund and ignored it in their work. 
(38) Weberian-influenced theories contributed substantially to the functionalism-
conflict debate, which raged in American sociology from the mid-1960s to the 
early-1970s. See e.g., Demerath and Peterson 1967. On Weberian conflict theory, 
see Collins 1975; 1979. Irving Zeitlin’s (1968) theory textbook, which interpreted 
classical theory as a debate with “Marx’s ghost” was widely read by sociologists. On 
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the Marx-Weber connection see e.g., Bryan Turner 1981; Antonio and Glassman 
1985; Weiss 1986; Wiley 1987. See Löwith’s ([1960] 1982) classic essay on Marx 
and Weber, and Schroeter’s (1985) review of the German literature on the Marx-
Weber relation. On Weber and critical theory, see Kellner 1985. 
(39) See e.g., Roscher and Knies ([1922] 1975); Critique of Stammler ([1907] 
1977);  The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations ([1924] 1976). The earlier 
translation of Weber’s General Economic History (1981) was republished with a new 
lengthy introduction, and Marianne Weber’s ([1926] 1975) biography of Weber 
was translated. 
(40) This extremely important translation was republished again in 1978 by the 
University of California Press. The two volume paperback version was acquired by 
many . 
(41) Roth (1977) held that Bendix’s work expressed Weber’s approach 
comprehensively and accurately and, therefore, demonstrating shortcomings of 
Parsons’ Weber and of the various political readings of Weber. See also Roth’s 
(1968) lengthy introduction to Economy and Society, where he asserted that he 
intended simply to supplement Bendix’s work.  
(42) Translations, commentaries, and applications following in the wake of the 
second wave, English-language Weber revival are too massive to summarize here. 
These still flow profusely. For examples of diverse types of work, see Poggi, 1983; 
Glassman and Murvar 1983; Hekman 1983; Eden 1983; Midgley 1983; Huff 
1984; Collins 1985; Lehmann and Roth 1987; Whimster and Lash 1987; Käsler 
1988; Oakes 1988; Goldman 1988; Sica 1988; Jaspers 1989; Bologh 1990; Sayer 
1991; Abraham 1992; Horowitz and Maley. 1994; Pellicani 1994; Turner and 
Factor 1994; Kalberg 1994; Breiner 1996; Swedberg 1998; Stephen Turner 
2000; Eliaeson 2002; Sica 2004a. See Sica’s (2004b) comprehensive English-
language Weber bibliography.  
(43) Increasingly, social theorists operated at the margins of the disciplines in which 
they earned their degrees and were employed. Rather than focusing on specialized 
work in their disciplinary fields, they read and engaged largely the work of other 
similarly located social theorists. On social theory’s independence from disciplinary 
work, see Stephen Turner 2004. 
(44) Mills died of a heart attack at the age of 45 in 1962. On Mills and “New 
Sociology,” see Horowitz 1964; Anderson 1971. 
(45) The seeds of this approach are visible in his early work; see Gouldner 1950, 
pp. 6-9, 53-66, 644-59.Gouldner cited, and likely was influenced by Gerth’s and 
  
82 
Mills’ Weber collection. 
(46) Gouldner’s project included his trilogy, or  The Dark Side of the Dialectic, -  
The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology ([1976] 1982a); The Future of Intellectuals 
and The Rise of the New Class ([1979] 1982b); and The Two Marxisms ([1980] 
1982c) and his posthumously published Against Fragmentation (1985). His earlier 
Enter Plato (1965) and The Coming Crisis of Sociology (1970) set the stage for this 
project. A final volume was said to be ready for publication, but did not appear. For 
analysis of Gouldner’s project, see Antonio 2005b. 
1 Gouldner implied that post-traditional normative arguments should have a 
sociological moment, deploying empirical-historical knowledge in claims about the 
consequences of value-oriented positions and actions. Moral principle does not 
disappear from such arguments, but it is historicized and emphasis on 
consequences replaces justification on the basis of authority per se. 
(47) See e.g. Habermas 1970, pp. 81-122; 1984; 1987a. On 1970s Habermas 
discourse, see e.g., Habermas 1970; 1971; 1973; 1979;  McCarthy 1978; and 
Telos 39 (Spring 1979). 
(48) Gouldner was loosely associated with Telos. He was not officially part of the 
staff, but he interacted with the editors and was friendly with chief editor, Piccone. 
Gouldner taught at Washington University (St. Louis), where the journal was housed 
and where Piccone taught, until he was denied tenure. Piccone criticized Gouldner 
(especially his positive view of sociology), but  considered him an ally. However, 
Habermas had a much greater presence than Gouldner in the pages of  the journal 
and in debates among its editors and regular contributors. Habermas stopped 
publishing in Telos after a nasty exchange with Piccone over the disposition of an 
article that he submitted to the journal. Yet the source of the split between the two 
theorists was their sharp intellectual and political differences. Piccone and his inner 
circle held that Habermas’ linguistic turn to “discourse ethics”departed critical 
theory for conformist, neo-Kantian liberalism.  
(49) See especially, Piccone 1977; 1978; Luke 1978. However, the same currents 
could be found easily in a perusal of Telos throughout the middle and later 1970s. 
Piccone claimed that liberal-left Democratic Party officials, welfare-state 
functionaries, educators, social movement leaders, and their professional-class allies 
were an hegemonic elite that shaped US social and political policy. The New Class 
thesis was shared by neoconservatives, was deployed centrally by right-wing think 
tanks, and became a mantra of the Republican Party. By contrast, Gouldner 
employed the same concept, but held that this stratum, regardless of its 
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contradictory facets, had emancipatory potential and is the last best hope for the 
left. 
(50) The ascendence of Piccone’s views, sharp attacks on Habermas, and drift 
toward populism led Telos’ Habermasian wing to break with the journal in the early-
1980s. However, Weber still had an obvious, albeit usually tacit, presence in Telos’ 
pervasive debates over  rationalization, disenchantment, and bureaucratization, 
which remained central even after the journal staff severed its ties with critical 
theory and veered toward anti-liberal populism. See Telos 78 (Winter 1988-89) for 
a symposium and special section on Weber.  
(51) Ferry and Renaut (1990, pp. 168) stated: “Bourdieu’s position still explicitly 
calls for a ‘generalized materialism,’ which it is true, he defines by bringing together 
both Marx and Weber.” See e.g., Bourdieu 1993, pp. 176-191; 1973; 1987. 
(52) Berger’s and Luckmann’s (1966) analysis of reality construction processes 
employed analytical themes from Marx’s thought and was later embraced, to 
Berger’s displeasure, by some left-leaning social constructionists. Horowitz’s 
Transaction Publishers remains a leading outlet for Weberian works. 
(53) David Smith suggested that I address these thinkers, and they deserve more 
thorough attention than can be provided here. See Nisbet, e.g., 1966; 1975; 
Berger, e.g.1967; 1970; 1977; 1986; 1990; 1992a; 2004; Berger, Berger, and 
Kellner 1974; See Berger 1992b and Horowitz 1993, on the decomposition of 
sociology and of progressive liberalism. See Lasch e.g., 1977; 1979; 1984; 1991; 
1996; and Sennett [1974] 1992. Daniel Bell (1976) also contributed centrally to 
this stream of criticism, but his work will be discussed in the next section. These 
thinkers contributed to a broader wave of cultural criticism, stressing the eroded 
American work ethic, depleted Puritan character, and overall US cultural and 
political exhaustion. They resurrected parallel Cold War era cultural insecurities in 
a new historical context (see Ehrenreich 1990). In Lasch’s later works, his positions 
on populism, tradition, political exhaustion, and the New Class converged with 
Piccone’s views. Piccone dedicated an issue of Telos to Lasch’s passing (Piccone 
1993; Jacoby 1993). Lasch (1991) attacked the liberal ideal of progress and 
cultural-left elitism, and analyzed sympathetically works of the conservative critics 
discussed in this section. However, he maintained that he remained on the left in 
regard to economic issues (i.e., holding that democracy requires “equal access to 
the means of competence”) and that he did not gravitate to the New Right (Lasch 
1995, p. 88; Brawer and Benvenuto 1993).  
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(54) Many sociological works on the Marx-Weber connection were published in the 
mid- and late-1980s, but the peak, critical intellectual force of this theme had 
already passed. 
(55) Postmodernism included conflictive political and antipolitical threads. Thinkers 
who advocated “postmodern politics” retained ties to modern social theory. See 
e.g., Arac 1986; Giddens 1991; 1992; Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 1992; 
Guttman 1994; Melucci 1996; Benhabib 1996; 1998; Hetherington 1998; for 
Marxist critique, see e.g., Perry Anderson 1983, 1998; Best and Kellner 1991; see 
Stephens 1996, on the roots of postmodern politics in 1960s “antidisciplinary” 
politics. By contrast, radical postmodernists, declaring an “end to politics,” broke 
much more sharply with modern social theory. See e.g., Baudillard 1983; 1988. 
(56) Nietzsche’s ideas had a formative impact on the Weimar era cultural climate; 
often they were not cited or mentioned directly, but they were “in the air” and 
exerted a major influence on the new wave of modernization critics and later 
theorists who followed in their tracks. Similarly, Weber’s ideas have been so central 
to the modernization debate and so culturally diffused that they too have exerted 
major tacit influence on modernity-postmodernity discourses. See Hughes [1958] 
1977, p. 34 and passim; Habermas 1987b, pp. 1-4 and passim; on Nietzsche and 
Weber, see Schroeder 1987; on the roots of the Nietzsche-Weber fusion and on its 
original intellectual and cultural contexts, see Scaff 1989; Antonio 1995; Safranski 
1998; 2002. 
(57) Habermas (1987b, pp. 211-42) held that Bataille’s earlier engagement of 
Weber and deployment of Weberian ideas in radical cultural criticism, likely 
influenced Foucault’s generation. On Weber and Foucault, see Gordon 1987; 
Whimster 1995. Depending on the disciplinary background, some North American 
postmodernists read directly Nietzsche and Weber. However, they seldom 
addressed their texts closely. 
(58) However, Gane presented Weber’s views carefully and mostly sympathetically, 
and supported continued engagement between Weberian theory and postmodernist 
thought. 
(59) Following Baudrillard, Bogart held that, in the absence of its simulated 
opposition, the postmodern system of control would implode from indifference and 
boredom. Bogart 1996, pp 179-83 and passim; Baudrillard 1983, pp. 77-104 and 
passim; 1987, pp. 97-101 and passim.      
(60) Bauman ([1989] 2000) made many direct references to Weber as the theorist 
who expressed most compellingly modernity’s bureaucratic formalism and, to some 
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degree, justified it. Bauman’s argument countered Daniel J. Goldhagen’s much 
debated view that the Holocaust originated strictly from widespread German hatred 
of Jews (Bauman 2000, pp. 222-50). Ira Cohen drew my attention to Weber’s role 
in the ongoing Holocaust debate. However, this important matter deserves more 
attention than can be given it here.     
(61) On the need to reconstruct Marxist theory to take account of postmodern 
culture, see Harvey 1989, pp. 343-59; Jameson 1984, pp. 77-92. Harvey held 
that Weber and Nietzsche anticipated postmodernism. He stated: “If Weber’s 
`sober warning’ reads like the epitaph of Enlightenment reason, then Nietzsche’s 
earlier attack upon its very premises must surely be regarded as its nemesis” 
(1989, p. 15). See Jameson 2002, pp. 31-2. 
(62) Postmodernism’s “antidisciplinary”or “multicultural” politics helped fuel the 
intense culture war between the cultural left and neoconservatives, manifested 
recently in heated battles over Jacques Derrida’s legacy in the media reportage of 
his death. His supporters portrayed him as a cultural genius, while critics described 
him as a culture destroyer. See Antonio 2005a. 
(63) This type of tacit convergence also appears in Bell’s critique of postmodernism. 
Both theorists deploy Nietzschean themes against what they portray as Nietzschean 
cultural trends.     
(64) Fukuyama saw Weber’s rationalization theory to be “despairing and 
pessimistic” -  a “nightmare of a rational and bureaucratized tyranny.” He implied 
that Parsons’ Weber fit better postwar, liberal society than Weber’s original theory. 
See Fukuyama 1992, pp. 68-70, 90. 
(65) Fukuyama saw economically-centered modernization theory to be incomplete 
and in need of cultural support. Although highly optimistic about US neoliberalism, 
he still subscribed, in part, to homogenization-regimentation theory. Although more 
moderately than Bell and Strauss, he acknowledged the limits of consumerism and 
economic individualism. Fukuyama held that Weber’s work on Protestantism 
confirms that religion can be harmonized with capitalism (1992, 226-34). Broader 
Nietzschean-Weberian themes inform Fukuyama’s overall discussion, bearing the 
imprint of his engagement with Strauss (and Strauss’s friend Alexandre Kojève). On 
the Nietzcschean elements, see Fukuyama 1992, pp. 211-34, 287-339. See 
Fukyama 1996, for extended discussion of neoliberalism’s need for cultural support 
or embeddedness. 
(66) See Titunik 1997 for a critique of this type of Weber application; See Bobbio 
1996 and Antonio 1998 on 1990s “endings discourses.” 
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(67) See e.g., Giddens 1990; 1994; 1998; Beck 1992; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 
1994. On US Third Way, “New Democrats, see Galston and Kamarck 1989 
(68) In the later 20th century US, Adam Smith, has tended to be reinterpreted and 
radicalized through the lens of Austrian economic theory. Ludwig von Mises and F. 
A. Heyak’s work has had major influence in neoconservative circles and on broader 
arguments about the need to roll back state regulation. Milton Friedman has also 
shaped these views. But Weber was a critic of Austrian economics and 
libertarianism. For a libertarian critique of Weber, see Anderson 2004. 
Full citizenship in Friedman’s deregulated, market-dominated democracy requires 
participation in stock-market and financial trading. The extent of participation 
depends on how much an individual owns and invests. Friedman held that the 
neoliberal regime accelerates vastly the creation of wealth and that its benefits, 
although very highly concentrated, trickle down to almost everyone. On the 1990s 
phase of globalization, see Antonio and Bonanno 2000. 
(69) Full citizenship in Friedman’s deregulated, market-dominated democracy 
requires participation in stock-market and financial trading. The extent of 
participation depends on how much an individual owns and invests. Friedman held 
that the neoliberal regime accelerates vastly the creation of wealth and that its 
benefits, although very highly concentrated, trickle down to almost everyone. On the 
1990s phase of globalization, see Antonio and Bonanno 2000. Marxist, Perry 
Anderson declared that “the virtually uncontested consolidation, and universal 
diffusion, of neoliberalism” was the most distinctive feature of the 1990s (2000, p. 
10). 
(70) Ritzer’s postmodern points about re-enchantment, simulation, hybridity are 
developed  more comprehensively in the later versions of his McDonaldization 
thesis and in his works on consumption and globalization. See Ritzer 1995; [1993] 
2004a; 2004b; [1999] 2005. 
(71) As stated above, however, Weber’s ideas are embedded in modernization 
discourses and are often implicit in globalization debates, especially in arguments 
about its continuities with and departures from modernity. Yet Weber’s impact 
should not be exaggerated. It is often indirect and hard to trace, and it is not 
present in all globalization discourse. 
(72) Castells (1996; 1997; 1998) mapped technical-economic, organizational, 
political, and cultural transformations, and addressed regional differences as well as 
overall trends. His hefty three volume work has affinity for Harvey’s (1989) earlier 
globalization study and Marx-Weber synthesis. By contrast to Harvey, however 
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Castells leaned more toward Weber than toward Marx. Castells stated: “The rule is 
still production for the sake of profit, and for private appropriation of profit on the 
basis of property rights - which is the essence of capitalism.”  (1998, p. 342; 1996, 
passim;1997 pp. 242-308). 
(73) On Weber, see Castells 1996: 195-200. Castells engaged Marxism seriously in 
his earlier work, and traces of Marx’s ideas appear in his discussion of globalization. 
For example, Castells’ vision of “information capitalism” parallels Marx’s view that 
science and technology would reduce greatly “living labor’s” role and drive overall 
development in advanced capitalism. 
(74) For a discussion of the varieties of globalization discourses and divergent 
stances over the role of capitalism and the state, see e.g., Held et al 1999, pp. 1-31 
and passim. 
(75) Schmitt criticized Weber, and claimed to go beyond his thought (e.g., Schmitt 
1988b, p. 7-8). As Mommsen acknowledged, Schmitt put aside the liberal 
democratic side of Weber’s thought. On  Schmitt and Weber, see Mommsen [1959] 
1984, pp. 381-89, 404-5, 448-51; 1989, pp. 171, 190-92. For criticism of 
Mommsen’s views on this matter and related approaches, see Roth 1965. Also, see 
Bryan Turner 2002. 
(76) On the weakened European nation-state system, see Schmitt [1950] 2003. For 
critiques of neoliberalism and globalization influenced by Schmittian ideas, see e.g., 
Mouffe 1993; 1999; Benoist 1996; Gottfried 1999a; Hardt and Negri 2000; 
Müller 2003, pp. 229-43. On the “friend and enemy” dichotomy, see Schmitt 
[1932] 1996. On neotribalism, see, e.g., Barber 1996; Maffesoli 1996; Hughey 
1998; Antonio 2000. 
(77) However, Huntington implied that the religious roots of divergent civilizations 
exert a more singular causal force than Weber ever suggested. Moreover, 
Huntington did not execute Weber’s type of detailed historical analysis of the 
various religious threads that traced their connections to divergent causal factors. 
(78) Huntington implied that China is becoming the US’ main enemy; he claimed 
that its leadership already views the US as its principal enemy, it has the economic 
and military power to resist US aims, and it will likely be the world’s top economy 
in fifty years. By contrast, he held that relations between the West and the Muslim 
would become less conflictive, as the population ages and other demographic 
pressures diminish, in the long term  [1997, pp. 118-21, 232]). 
(79) Turner does not mention Lippmann. Schmitt ([1926] 1988, pp. 6) admired 
Lippmann’s Public Opinion ([1922] 1997), which held that democratic participation 
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is limited and distorted by symbolic politics and “manufactured consent” and that 
elite decision-making is inevitable. Lippmann advocated the increased role of 
experts, which parallels Turner’s rule by commission.    
(80) Some and perhaps many persons in the Republican foreign policy network, 
especially those associated with neoconservative think tanks and organizations, such 
as the “Project for a New American Century,” have, at least, some knowledge of 
Strauss and Schmitt and express themes rooted in their theories. However, these 
threads are often hard to trace. On Schmitt and Strauss, see Strauss [1932] 1996; 
Drury 1997, pp. 65-96; On Schmitt’s and Strauss’ relation to US neoconservatism, 
see Drury 1997; McCormick 1997; and Norton 2004. For criticisms of left-leaning 
claims about Schmitt’s impact on American conservatism and neoconservatism, see 
Piccone and Ulmen 2002 and Bendersky 2002. On the neoconservative critique of 
liberal modernity and consequent vision of international relations, see Williams 
2005.   
(81) Taints of this dynamic appear in popular works such as Barber’s Jihad versus 
McWorld (1996) and Friedman’s Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000). 
(82) A group of wealthy liberals announced recently that they will fund development 
of opposition Democratic think tanks to counter the Republican attacks (Edsall 
2005). 
(83) Schmitt ([1922] 1988a) justified full executive control of the state apparatus in 
a crisis, neutralizing the role of parliament and the courts. Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution already allowed the president unlimited power in a state of emergency. 
However, Schmitt’s argument about the state of exception, combined with his 
friend-enemy politics (which envisioned the liberal world to be in perpetual crisis), 
provided grounds for a permanent state of exception and authoritarian 
concentration of power. Schmitt did not only analyze the state of exception, but he 
embraced it normatively. Moreover, his actions as a star Weimar era, lawyer and 
legal theorist helped bring the Nazi regime to power. His argument about the state 
of exception was “initially part of a volume dedicated to the memory of Max 
Weber”(Müller 2003, p. 22)  Mommsen held that Weber, who helped draft the 
Weimar constitution, expressed “no interest” in article 48. However, he also 
claimed that Weber anticipated and influenced Schmitt’s ideas about the state of 
exception (Mommsen 1984, pp. 377-78, 382). For divergent views on this matter, 
see  Bendersky 1979; Wolin 1990b: Gross 2000; Gottfried 2005 . 
(84) CNN employed the term “State of Emergency” as the lead to its TV reports on 
the Hurricane Katrina crisis and especially on the slow response to get food and 
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water and help rescue the mostly poor, Afro-American citizens of flooded and 
devastated New Orleans.    
(85) Few contemporary Schmitteans dwell on the issue of the state of exception or 
its connections to fascism. Rather they usually deploy Schmitt’s ideas to attack 
liberal democracy’s shortcomings, defend the need rein in or institutionally embed 
neoliberalism’s hegemonic economism, or criticize US imperialism. Even Telos’ 
9/11 symposium did not draw directly on the concept. See Telos 120 (Summer 
2001; Fall 2001), pp 129-85. By contrast, the liberal editors of Theory, Culture and 
Society’s 19[4] (August 2002) called their special 9/11 section “State of 
Emergency.” Schmitt is discussed, but not extensively.  
(86) He and Negri express a related variant of homogenization-regimentation 
theory, expressing a growing Italian, left-Schmittean influence on US social theory. 
(87) His equation of modernity with the camps converges with Bauman’s ([1989] 
2000) view of the holocaust as inhering in the structure of  modernity. 
(88) Wittgenstein was a distant second in the 2005 vote. Marx also won the BBC 
1999 poll - Einstein was second! Caught by surprise and very disappointed by the 
outcome, the liberal Economist (2005) magazine charged that the vote must have 
been rigged. See also, Wheen 2005; and 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/greatest_philosopher_vote.shtml).  
See e.g., John Cassidy’s (1997) New Yorker article about how the consequences of 
neoliberalism are bringing about a “return of Marx.” Certain left-leaning, cultural 
theorists and social theorists moved from postmodernism back toward Marx or 
stressed the need to address the issues of economic inequality and social justice. 
For example, Derrida’s Specters of Marx (1994) broke with the anti-Marxist left-
Heideggerianism portrayed by Bloom. Jameson and Harvey also shifted back 
toward Marx. Jameson (2002, p 215.) concludes a recent work on modernism with 
the argument that theorists should substitute the term capitalism for modernity, and 
Harvey (2003) takes an emphatic Marxist stance against neoliberalism and 
imperialism. In another work, Harvey (2000, pp. 3-18) explains that his current 
undergraduates, regardless of political views, are engaged by Capital and easily 
connect its themes to current events. He says that teaching this text is much easier 
in today’s neoliberal context than in the early-1970s, when political interest in Marx 
peaked. He argues that it was harder then, at the height of the postwar welfare state 
and ascendent social democracy, for students to see the connection of Marx’s 
economic ideas to advanced capitalist societies. The anti-Marxist, postmodernist, 
pragmatist Richard Rorty also exhorts the US, cultural left to take up the issue of 
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economic injustice (1998; 1999, pp. 223-61). 
(89) The American idea of liberty is multi-sided, but it has stressed especially 
strongly property rights, free markets, and consumer freedom. On the historical 
development of the US conceptions of liberty and equality, see Foner 1998; Dewey 
[1935] 1987. On the relation of liberty and equality in late 19th and early 20th 
modernization theories and in comparative perspective (US and Europe), see 
Kloppenberg 1986   
(90) New political forces are stirring. For example, diverse international groups 
supported the July 2005 “Live 8" concerts, rally and protests at the Gleneagles, 
Scotland, G8 meeting of economic ministers and movement to “make poverty 
history.” The earlier electoral victory of the left-wing, Venezuelan populist, Hugo 
Chavez took US pundits by surprise. His anti-neoliberal stances have made him an 
example to other Latin American groups wanting to seek alternative policy regimes. 
Chavez’s use of oil revenues to pay for programs for the poor helped inspire the 
2005 peasant and worker uprising in Bolivia calling for nationalization of natural-
gas preserves and bringing down the old leadership. Center-left and left parties 
have been making gains in much of the region and challenging neoliberal, free-
trade policies. In the US, “living wage” campaigns, opposition to the superstore, 
Wal-Mart’s labor policies and local retail monopolies, and other local, regional, and 
national efforts to regulate and socially embed capitalism run against the neoliberal 
consensus that rules in official American political circles. 
(91) Ira Cohen (1985) posed a similar argument years ago. I have much more 
appreciation for his prescient theoretical insights now than I did then.  
(92) The later 20th century  pragmatism revival  (e.g., Richard Rorty, Nancy Fraser, 
Cornell West, Benjamin Barber) fuse cultural politics with class politics and oppose 
neoliberalism’s minimalist vision of democracy and antiliberal homogenization-
regimentation theses. 
(93) Like other theorists discussed above, neopragmatists have sometimes absorbed 
themes from Weber via arguments about modernization, rationalization, and 
bureaucratization (e.g., in the  Habermas debate; see Aboulafia, Bookman, and 
Kemp 2002). Indirect fusions also appear in their theories of  “deliberative,” 
“pragmatic,” or  “communitarian” democracy (e.g., Anderson 1990; Kloppenberg 
1998, pp. 82-89; Selznick 1992). Kloppenberg (1986) engaged Dewey and Weber 
directly at key junctures in his intellectual history. However, the Dewey-Weber 
fusion here is my own effort to trace convergences and mesh differences between 
the two theorists.  
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(94) Although I speak of a Dewey-Weber fusion to be succinct and for ease of 
expression, George Herbert Mead contributed substantially to the “Deweyan” 
position and is also discussed below. Dewey and Mead were colleagues early in 
their careers, and developed their basic views of pragmatism together. Dewey was a 
much more prolific writer than Mead, and developed a much larger corpus of social 
theory and political theory. However, Mead developed the social psychology 
presumed by Dewey’s theories of communication, society, and politics. Dewey 
asserted that Mead’s social psychology “worked a revolution” in his thought, after 
he grasped its “full implications.” He saw Mead to be the most “original mind” of 
his generation in American philosophy. On Mead’s seminal contribution, see Dewey 
1989a. However, most of the theory of democracy and science that I link to Weber 
comes from Dewey. 
(95) Jefferson called for periodic land redistribution and for landless white-males to 
be given fifty acres. On Jefferson, see Dewey [1939] 1988e, pp. 172-88. On the 
economy and cultural and political participation, also see Dewey [1929] 1988d, pp. 
90-98; [1939] 1988f. 
(96) Weber saw value judgements and empirical-historical judgments to be based 
on fundamentally different types of discourse, and argument. Ignoring the 
difference, he held, abjures “responsibility” and “the elementary duty of scientific 
self-control” ([1904] 1949c, p. 98). 
(97) Like Nietzsche, Weber stressed that science in the broad sense, or systematic 
inquiry, has a usually tacit, normative basis that makes the knowledge “worth 
knowing” and that directs inquirers’ attention to a finite portion of experience. 
Although not free of values per se, Weber argued that “cultural science” demands 
highly disciplined restraint, or a focused effort to hold back from snap judgements; 
inquirers must be open to the world’s obdurate facets to engage “inconvenient 
facts,” which contradict their cherished values, firm expectations, pet theories, 
linguistic conventions, and moral beliefs. Marianne Weber’s ([1926] 1975, pp. 
684) reference to Max Weber’s “illusion-free illumination of the various roots of 
existence” referred to his storied capacity for this type of restraint or, in his words, 
“objectivity.”  This theme converges with Nietzsche’s views about overcoming moral 
illusions. He called for an education that teaches us “to see - habituating the eye to 
repose, to patience, to letting things come to it; learning to defer judgment, to 
investigate and comprehend the individual case in all of its aspects. This is the first 
preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react immediately to a stimulus, but to 
have the restraining, stock-taking instincts in ones control” (Nietzsche [1888] 1968, 
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p. 65). Mead ([1934] 1967, pp. 98-9) also saw this “delayed reaction” as a 
fundmental feature of intelligence. 
(98) Describing hearing Weber’s “science as a vocation” speech, Karl Löwith 
([1960] 1982, p. 17) stated: “The acuteness of the questions he posed 
corresponded with his refusal to offer any cheap solutions. He tore down all the 
veils from desirable objects, yet everyone none the less sensed that the heart of this 
clear thinking intellect was profoundly humane. After innumerable revolutionary 
speeches by literary activists, Weber’s words were like a salvation.” 
(99) See Weber 1949b, p 18; 1946b, pp. 126-27; 1946c, pp. 154-56.  Marianne 
Weber’s ([1926] 1975, pp. 659-84) discussion of his heroic realism implies that 
Max Weber saw science as a post-traditional normative ethic as well as an 
instrumental tool. Löwith’s ([1933] 1986, p. 17) portrayal of Weber’s “Science as a 
Vocation” speech implies the same type of normative vision of science. On Weber’s 
ethics and science, see Bruun 1972; Schluchter 1979; 1981; 1989; Roth and 
Schluchter 1979; Roth 1984; Breiner 1996. 
(100) Regardless of the extension of expert knowledge production and decision-
making, Dewey held that educated citizens can still make informed choices between 
conflictive positions, detect and resist forms of manipulation, and distinguish 
democrats from demagogs. He stressed that these capacities are always imperfect 
among the masses, but that the same holds for judgment of technical and political 
elites.  
(101) Fusing threads from Mead and Dewey with those from Durkheim and other 
classical and contemporary theorists, Habermas also aimed to forge a 
communication model that escapes western epistemology’s dualistic subject-object 
split and consequent contradictions. By giving privilege to the normative realm of 
“symbolic interaction” over the instrumental realm of social organization and 
holding that they are in inherent tension, however, he splits entwined  social 
processes into separate domains and, thus, continues the subject-centered, 
epistemological dualism he claims to overcome. This split or dualism inheres in his 
self-described “quasi-transcendental”move to communicative ethics. Like Weber, 
Habermas does not escape from the philosophy of the subject or philosophy of 
consciousness (Antonio 1989). By contrast, Mead and Dewey saw the domains of 
symbolic interchange and social organization to be co-present in the social process; 
they treated communication as an embodied practice entwined with cooperative 
activity and associational and organizational life. Mead stated that: “Communication 
is a social process whose natural history shows that it arises out of cooperative 
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activities... in which some phase of the act of one form, which may be called a 
gesture, acts as a stimulus to others to carry on their parts of the social act” ([1927] 
1964e, p. 312). See Mead [1934] 1967, for a detailed account of “taking the 
attitude of the other” and other social psychological aspects of the communication 
model. See also Mead  [1908] 1964a; [1917-1918] 1964b; [1922] 1964c; [1924-
1925] 1964d; [1927] 1964e; [1929]1964f. See Dewey  [1925] 1988a, pp. 132-
61, for a brief account of his view of meaning and communication. 
(102) Like Jefferson, Dewey and Mead held that the “moral sense” arises from 
cooperative social intercourse. Dewey and Mead argued that cooperation and moral 
judgment require “taking the attitude of others.” In their view, this capacity is 
forged in face-to-face social relationships, beginning in parent-child relations and 
extending into informal play groups, schools, and other local associations). 
Participating in wider networks of local cooperative activities (e.g., a sports team), 
they held, gives rise to the “generalized other”or, the ability to share attitudes, 
though abstraction, with distant others (e.g., a particular manager) and collective 
others (e.g., district managers or the firm) and, thereby, grasp one’s location and 
duties in relation to complex sets of related, impersonal roles. On the generalized 
other, see Mead  [1934] 1967, pp. 151-63. 
(103) For an earlier version of the argument above, see Antonio and Kellner 
1992a. See e.g., Dewey and Tufts [1932] 1985, pp. 275-84. See Beth Singer 
1999, for a contemporary Mead- Dewey theory of rights and related critique of 
natural rights theory. 
(104) Dewey’s conception of the rise of democratic government counters libertarian 
claims about split between public and private. See Dewey1988b, pp. 238-58 
1988e, pp. 173-88. 
(105) These links have to be rethought in today’s global context, but Dewey and 
Mead imagined already the development of transnational “generalized others” and 
the formation of larger international connections and forms of cultural integration. 
In their view, wider attitude sharing in a regional or national cultures favor 
transnational connections and the converse.    
(106) See e.g., Putnam 2000. Bob Kent reminded me of convergence between 
Dewey and Weber on the importance of voluntary association in American 
democracy. This issue deserves more attention than I can give it here. See Weber 
[1906]1946e. 
(107) Dewey argued that this task requires re-embracing and broadening a tradition 
that originated with Jefferson. Dewey claimed that it is still alive, though dormant, 
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within American culture ([1939] 1988e, pp. 187, 173-188 passim). He held that 
capitalist “pecuniary culture” suppresses the democratic aspects of the US tradition; 
i.e. “equal opportunity and free association and intercommunication” are “obscured 
and crowded out” by a free-market individualism that has “become the source of 
inequalities and oppressions”(Dewey ([1929] 1988d, p. 49). Dewey saw social and 
political ideals to be rooted in historical social relations and social processes and 
often to be in direct contradiction to existent social realities. Like the early 
Frankfurt School, he held that critique should build on historical tensions between 
democratic claims and institutional social realities. Dewey argued that: “Ideals 
express possibilities; but they are genuine ideals only so far as they are possibilities 
of what is now moving. Imagination can set them free from their encumbrances and 
protect them as a guide in attention to what now exists. But save as they are related 
to actualities, they are pictures in a dream”([1929] 1988d, p. 122).  
(108) In a survey of people from forty-five nations (worldwide), Americans 
disagreed most strongly with the question that their “success is determined by 
forces outside their control,” and, in a survey of twelve western nations, Americans 
expressed the least support for state-supported, social welfare, safety-nets.See Pew 
Center 2005.  
